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ABSTRACT
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM:
A TALE OF TWO SYSTEMS
By
Erika Gebo 
University o f New Hampshire, May, 2002
This study examines two juvenile justice reform efforts in one state. The first 
initiative, a detention risk assessment tool, is embedded within the second initiative, a 
family court pilot project. Detention screening tools have been developed primarily to 
alleviate detention center overcrowding and to reduce disproportionate minority 
confinement in those centers. The instrument under analysis limits discretion by judges in 
the detention decision making process. The second reform effort, family court, is 
premised on the rehabilitative ideaL In these courts, judges are presumably given wide 
latitude in deciding cases in order to meet the individual needs o f each offender. These 
two seemingly disparate reform initiatives are examined through two theoretical 
traditions, borrowing concepts from organizational theory and penal theory.
Family courts are organized much more bureaucratically than the traditional court 
system, yet their goals are explicitly rehabilitative. Bureaucratic tenets of consistency and 
predictability are in conflict with rehabilitative tenets o f holism and individualism. 
Analysis o f the risk assessment instrument as well as other case processing outcomes is
xii
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conducted to understand dynamics of family court in relation to dynamics of the 
traditional court system in this state.
The study population consists of all detainees in four counties in one state over a 
one-year period (n = 174). Ordinary least squares regression and logistic regression were 
used to test hypotheses about case processing. Results show that family court is meeting 
its expressed purpose of rehabilitation on a number of different measures. Consistent with 
what would be expected from a rehabilitative approach, family court tends to resist the 
risk assessment instrument more so than the traditional court. Family court also is more 
likely to order assessments for youth, hold youth in detention for longer periods of time, 
and less likely to accept plea bargains. In the end, however, there are no differences with 
regard to sentencing between family court and the traditional court system. This research 
demonstrates the need to take court structure into account in case processing studies. 
While family court systems are advocated as the most appropriate structure to address 
delinquency, this study suggests further investigation of their outputs is needed.
xiii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile justice system is at the center o f an ideological debate about how 
youth should be treated, and the juvenile court is at the core o f the juvenile justice 
system. The court traditionally is based on the premise o f parens patriea in which the 
court, as a parental figure, acts in the best interests o f each individual child. Some praise 
the court for addressing the immaturity of youth and for its attempts to rehabilitate rather 
than punish youth (i.e. Zimring, 1998). On the other hand, some adamantly believe that a 
rehabilitative focus has led to leniency in treating youth, which in turn, is responsible for 
the high rates o f youth crime and will be responsible for a generation of “superpredators” 
(Dilulio, 1995; Elikann, 1999). This project examines two different court structures 
within one state. One structure, family court, is a reform effort that is a conscious attempt 
to return to the rehabilitative focus, while the other structure, district court, is a traditional 
system of processing juvenile offenders. Another reform effort focused on juvenile 
detention is examined within these two court structures. To adequately understand this 
ongoing issue, it is necessary to situate the court in a historical context.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
History of Juvenile Court 
The juvenile court has undergone immense changes since its inception 103 years ago. 
Changes can best be understood through a policy lens that reflects broader shifts in 
society. The juvenile court was not conceived upon equity, rather it was borne from a 
rehabilitative idea during the Progressive Era that emphasized that the appropriate 
treatment for each youth depends upon individual situations. These progressives were 
called “child savers” who believed that children were inherently different than adults and, 
due to their special situation, needed to be treated differently. Rothman (1980) 
documented this benevolent view o f the child savers. Under the rehabilitative umbrella, 
however, lower class youth and minorities were the subject o f greater social control 
because they were perceived as needing more assistance (Platt, 1969). While there is 
some scholarly debate about the purposes of the child savers, many studies note the 
rehabilitative orientation of the court (Colomy and Kretzmann, 199S, Platt, 1969, Sutton, 
1985). In its original conception, juvenile judges had broad discretion in deciding cases. 
As time went on, discretion was limited. During the civil rights movement, Supreme 
Court action reduced judges’ discretion by providing greater procedural safeguards to 
juveniles. Arguably, as a result of these measures, the inherent inequalities in youth 
processing were reduced (Feld, 1998 in Tonry). Procedural safeguards fell short, 
however, o f providing the full due process rights accorded to adults. The confidentiality 
of juvenile court proceedings and the prohibition o f jury trials have continued to fuel the 
fire of critics concerned with equitable treatment o f youth (Feld, 1984; Schwartz, 1989).
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3In the 1970s, an increase in juvenile crime and the conclusion o f‘nothing works’ 
in rehabilitative programming brought about a disillusionment of the rehabilitative ideal 
o f the court and the larger juvenile justice and criminal justice systems (Lipton,
Martinson, and Wilks, 1975; Martinson, 1974; Stinchcombe, Adams, Heimer, ScheppeL, 
Smith, and Taylor, 1980; Wilson, 1983). As a result o f the perceived failure o f the court 
to rectify children, many conservatives called for the court’s demise believing the court 
was too “soft” on young offenders (Van den Haag, 1975). Meanwhile, many liberals also 
clamored for juvenile court abolition for another reason: widespread abuse o f discretion 
in the treatment and sentencing of youth. Echoing earlier sentiments, these reformers 
believed that because youth were not offered all the due process rights of adults, they 
were second-class citizens (Feld, 1990).
Thirty years later the debate still rages and the juvenile court remains. Schwartz, 
Weiner, and Enosh (1999, in Schwartz) attribute the court’s continued existence to 
institutional history and influential judges. In the broader field of social policy, this view 
may be best characterized by Skocpol’s (Le. 1992) theory of how policy is made and 
develops in which Progressive reformers brought about the inception of the juvenile court 
and historic legacies (Le. benevolent views of children) and influential political agents 
(Le. the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges) have perpetuated the 
institution.
Some argue that the juvenile court of today is at a  crossroads in terms of its future 
and its purpose. Increasingly, states have added a punishment orientation to their juvenile 
code. Washington State, for instance, has gone the furthest in remodeling their juvenile
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4court to resemble its punitive adult counterpart (Castellano, 1986). Most states now 
include both a treatment and a punishment aspect to their legislative code (Snyder and 
Sickmund, 1999). Legislative reforms have not pleased everyone for a number of 
different reasons. Some believe that the coexistence of punishment and treatment within 
the same institution is wrong and that Progressive reformers initially made a fetal flaw in 
combining the aspects of social control with public welfare. These reformers advocate the 
abolition of the juvenile court in order to provide the foil range of procedural safeguards 
to youth that has been afforded to adults (See works by Feld). Others argue that the 
juvenile court is appropriate to handle both punishment and treatment, and it can do so 
effectively with modifications to the current system (Krisberg and Austin, 1993). A 
variation of the latter opinion is reflected in those who support a restorative justice 
approach to juvenile justice. Restorative justice advocates believe that the juvenile court 
can effectively balance the offender’s need for treatment with the needs of the 
community and the victim for accountability and reparation (See works by Bazemore).
Ideological debates about the court’s purposes have melded into practical reform 
experiments. The court structure itself has been undergoing changes in many states.
There traditionally has been a lot o f statewide variation in juvenile court organization 
(National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2002). Some states have separate juvenile courts, 
which hear only juvenile cases; other states hear juvenile cases in their courts of limited 
or general jurisdiction that also hear civil and criminal matters; still other states hear 
juvenile cases in family court; finally, some states consist o f a mixture of systems. In feet,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5almost 40% of all states have at least two types of juvenile court systems in operation 
(National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2002).
While legislatures continue to add punitive components to the juvenile code, a 
seemingly contradictory process is happening on the court level Courts are 
experimenting with different court structures, in particular, a family court system which 
is touted as a return to the rehabilitative ideal for juvenile cases (Famworth, Frazier, and 
Neuberger, 1988). Moore and Wakeling (in Tonry, 1997) cite the proliferation of family 
court in states around the country and in Western Europe. It is a statewide experiment 
with the family court that is of interest in this study, because while there has been an 
increasing interest in family court for juvenile cases, there correspondingly has been no 
examination of the impact of divergent court systems on the juvenile justice process. It 
may be that court structure has an effect on how cases are processed by the system.
Juvenile Justice Processing
This study examines juvenile justice processing in two court systems, though 
studies document that juvenile court operations in general have been and continue to vary 
widely in procedures and results. This is not surprising given the different perspectives 
and the disparate views about the juvenile court. The juvenile court has been described 
as a loosely coupled system (Lemert, 1970a) which has no strong, centralized 
organization. Other studies o f juvenile court operations have confirmed Lemert’s 
description (Jacobs, 1990; Leiber and Jamieson, 199S; Schwartz, et al., in Schwartz). In 
the juvenile court paradigm o f a loosely coupled system, key individual actors and 
situational idiosyncrasies have a great deal o f opportunity to influence the operation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6each court. The resulting variation in juvenile court operation and processing among 
individual courts has led some to charge that the court is discriminatory, particularly with 
regard to ethnicity, gender, and class. For instance, some scholars have found that non­
white males are punished more severely than white males; females are punished more 
severely for minor offenses; and that lower class youth are punished more severely than 
those in the middle and upper classes (Le. Chesney-Lind and Shelden, 1992; Thomberry, 
1979). Other scholars, however, have found no differences in juvenile offender 
processing (Le. Bailey and Peterson, 1981; Johnson and Scheuble, 1991; Leiber and 
Jamieson, 1995).
There is one relatively consistent finding in juvenile court processing literature: 
detention decisions often have a large impact on future decisions. Specifically, youth 
detained prior to court disposition regardless of ethnicity, gender, or class, are more likely 
to be sentenced to out of home placement than other youth, even after controlling for 
other variables such as seriousness of offense (Frazier and Cochran, 1986; McCarthy and 
Smith, 1986; See Schwartz and Barton, Eds., 1994). Although discrimination at the 
detention stage of the court process has not been the main catalyst for reform, the issue of 
discrimination coupled with the practical reality o f detention overcrowding, has led to the 
development o f detention screening tools to assist juvenile court actors in making 
appropriate detention decisions (See Schwartz and Barton, Eds., 1994). Such tools have 
only been in existence for the past decade and many states are now considering their use. 
These instruments limit discretion in the decision making process, but have not yet been
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7linked to the larger questions of court processing. It may well be that the use o f these 
reform tools may vary by court type (Le. family court, court of limited jurisdiction).
While the topic of juvenile court processing continues to be a widely researched 
issue that has produced mixed and inconsistent results, most court processing research 
only deals with sentencing outcomes. There are, however, other ‘intermediary outcomes’, 
such as case processing time, that are important to study (i.e. Butts, 1994). The ongoing 
debate about the purposes and the existence of the juvenile court, the mixed findings of 
court processing practices, experiments with different court structures, and the use of 
reformatory decision making instruments make the juvenile justice system a fertile 
ground for continued research. A clearer understanding of how these instruments operate 
and how cases are processed in different court systems holds implications for the 
treatment o f juvenile offenders and juvenile justice policy. The purpose of this study is to 
evaluate a decision making instrument and to examine that instrument within the larger 
context o f juvenile court processing in two different court systems: a family court and a 
district court (court of limited jurisdiction).
There are two main objectives of this study. The first objective is to conduct an 
evaluation o f a detention screening instrument. The evaluation will examine systematic 
use of the tool and examine decision congruence, or the degree to which judges abide by 
the detention screening instrument’s results. The second objective is to examine case 
processing, including intermediary outcomes and dispositional outcome. Both o f these 
objectives are embedded within two different court structures in one state.
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8Theoretical Framework
Theory development and utilization in juvenile court processing literature has 
been noticeably lacking, particularly when compared to its adult counterpart (Mears and 
Field, 2000). Detention screening tool studies have typically lacked any sort of theoretical 
framework and, as noted, have not been linked to the broader juvenile court decision 
making process (For example, see Dembo, et aL, 1994; Schwartz and Barton, Eds.,
1994). Some studies of juvenile court processing have relied on penal theory, or the 
degree to which courts are oriented toward punishment or treatment, to explain court 
processing (i.e. Cohen and Khiegel, 1979b; Feld, 1991). Penal theory explanations have 
been tied to individual orientations toward punishment as well as to institutional and 
geographical attributes that are believed to be symbolic o f punishment orientations. Other 
research has examined the issue of differential juvenile court processing through a 
conflict lens (Le. Chesney-Lind, 1988,1997; Crew, 1991) in which ethnicity, gender, and 
class are all salient variables used in decision-making processes to treat minorities more 
severely. Finally, a small but growing group of studies has incorporated elements of 
organizational theory into explanations of court processing (Le. Hagan, 1977).
Theoretically, this study utilizes elements from both penal philosophy and from 
organizational theory. Specifically, the study examines the relationship between 
‘rehabilitation’ and elements o f ‘bureaucratization’. Essential elements o f rehabilitation 
include individualization and a treatment focus. According to this perspective, each child 
entering the system is seen as an individual and efforts to rehabilitate necessarily involve 
an examination of the child’s social world -  family, school, community. Sentences are
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9meted out based on individual need. The premise of bureaucratization stands in sharp 
contrast. According to Weber, as the world becomes more and more modernized, 
bureaucracy will be the hallmark o f organizations in the economic, political, and 
administrative realms because it is the most efficient form of government. A 
characteristic of bureaucratization is assembly-line justice in which like cases are treated 
similarly because the law is no longer able to deal with individual differences. This 
theory suggests that in more bureaucratized locations, juvenile court processing should be 
meted out more uniformly. There is a tension between the rehabilitative ideal and the 
tenets of bureaucracy. That tension forms the basis for the hypotheses tested in this study.
Significance o f Study 
This study is significant for several reasons. Importantly, this study examines the 
effects of reform efforts. This includes an examination of court reform and of detention 
reform. This study also places that detention reform instrument in the larger context of 
decision making. Moreover, many previous studies assessing the effects of court 
processing have not taken into account intermediary outcomes or how juvenile justice 
processing differs according to court type. This is particularly significant as current shifts 
in ideologies, legislative mandates, and social policies are part o f a “watershed of reform” 
in juvenile justice practices (McGarrell, 1988), which all may affect processing. Finally, 
although most studies of juvenile court processing tend to examine only one or two 
courts, a consistent finding has been that courts vary widely in their decision making 
process (Cohen, 1975; McCarthy and Smith, 1986; Mears and Field, 2000). A basic task 
for research has been to extend analysis ofjuvenile court processing beyond only one or
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two courts and to more systematically examine the variables associated with the decision 
making process (Barton, 1976). This study does so.
Juvenile Court Terms and Structure
In order to understand the juvenile court process, it is important to understand 
terminology used in the juvenile court as well as the structure of the court itself. The 
juvenile court uses different language, often characterized as euphemistic, to describe the 
juvenile justice process, as compared to that of adults. In juvenile court, a “petition” is 
filed against an offender, rather than a “complaint”. If the youth is deemed a flight risk or 
a personal or community safety concern, s/he can be “detained” prior to court hearings. A 
detention center is the juvenile counterpart to adult jaiL Although juveniles and adults 
both attend an “arraignment” to answer charges, a juvenile does not plead guilty, not 
guilty, or no lo contendre. Instead, s/he must plead “true” or “not true”, there is no option 
for “no contest”. A juvenile who pleads “not true” must then be “adjudicated”. This 
process is equivalent to a trial In most states, juveniles are not afforded a jury trial. Also, 
in smaller areas, the state’s prosecutor is often the town’s police juvenile officer. Upon 
presentation of all the evidence, if the judge finds in favor of the state, a juvenile is said 
to be adjudicated “delinquent”. If the judge finds against the state, the case is dismissed.
The final phase in the juvenile court process is the “disposition”. This is similar to 
the adult sentencing phase. Probation officers are required in most states to be involved 
after the adjudication in order to make appropriate recommendations to the judge 
regarding the juvenile’s disposition. Among other sentencing alternatives, the judge can 
continue the case upon good behavior o f the juvenile; assign informal also called
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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unsupervised, probation for a period o f time; assign formal, or supervised probation; 
sentence the youth to a non-secure facility, such as a wilderness program; or assign the 
youth to secure placement, known as a ‘Training school”. In the adult system, the training 
school is prison. While there is some variation among and within states as to how the 
process operates, a general schematic will aid in clarifying the process. A flow chart at 
the end of the chapter illustrates the operation o f the juvenile court process.
Organisation of Study 
The second chapter o f this work will discuss the literature on reform, risk 
assessment instruments and juvenfle justice processing. The following chapter will 
explain the current study and the research methods employed. Subsequent sections will 
discuss the results of the evaluation and case processing research. The final chapter will 
conclude with a discussion of policy implications and directions for future research.
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This chapter is organized into three areas: court reform efforts, detention reform 
efforts, and court processing studies. Analysis of court processing studies comprises the 
majority of the chapter as there has been a significant amount of research done in that 
area, and comparatively little with regard to the reform efforts discussed here. The 
chapter concludes with how penal theory and elements o f organizational sociological 
theory specific to bureaucratization will be used to relate these areas of research to the 
present study.
Court Reform Efforts 
Court reform efforts are necessarily linked to ideas about punishment and 
corrections. Although there are many influences on how offenders are treated in court, 
penal orientations and justice models may affect outcomes. Typologies of penal 
orientations and justice models abound (i.e. Pakcer, 1968, Hagan, 1989). Penal 
orientations are often melded into a discussion of justice models, or how justice is carried 
out. Of concern here are typologies that have been used to describe the juvenile justice 
system. They include rehabilitation, or a focus on treating each offender through a 
comprehensive examination o f his/her needs. This view is often contrasted with
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retribution, a focus on punishing the offender in response to an offense against society. 
Alternatively, in a due process model the emphasis is on ensuring that the accused 
receives full due process rights. Under this model, it is better to let the guilty go free than 
to sentence the innocent. This view is often compared to a crime control model that 
emphasizes the need to punish offenders as a deterrent to further criminal activity and 
downplays offenders’ rights. In reality, the present juvenile justice system embodies 
elements o f all o f these models. The typologies are useful in the context o f the current 
research, however, in order to understand the history o f reform efforts and particularly 
those examined here.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the original conception of the juvenile court 
was derived from the Progressive Era, a time of great reform in the US (Pease, 1962). 
The Child Savers believed that children were not the same as adults and should be treated 
differently, even when it came to criminal offenses. Out of this rationale, a distinct 
juvenile court system with separate correctional programs and facilities developed during 
this time. The newly created juvenile system was devoted to rehabilitation, not 
punishment. The U.S. Children’s Bureau reflected the sentiment o f the newly established 
juvenile court when they held that, unlike adult court, the juvenile court should be based 
on treatment and adapted to individual needs (Children’s Bureau, 1923).
Major court reform efforts took hold in the 1960s and 1970s. As previously 
discussed, widespread criticism of discrimination against non-white youth in the 1960s 
led to the curtailment of some discretionary practices through procedural safeguards. 
According to some scholars, these reforms also signaled a shift in philosophy away from 
the rehabilitative ideal toward a more due process and punitive approach to delinquency
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(Feld, 1988; McGarrell, 1988). Changes in procedure, however, did not stop some groups 
from continuing to advocate for a rehabilitative approach. One such rehabilitative 
measure was a family court, which would take the individual needs and dynamics o f each 
family into account in devising appropriate treatment plans. The National Advisory 
Committee (1976) not only recommended that jurisdictions around the U.S. adapt due 
process rights, but also a family court model to assist in better family functioning. They 
believed that rights of children could be safeguarded through due process while the court 
continued to act in the best interests of the child and family most appropriately through a 
family court system.
McGarrell (1988) disputed the notion of protecting rights while acting in the best 
interests of the child. He stated that the court’s shift toward procedural rights re-oriented 
the sentencing practices of the court away from rehabilitation and individualization 
toward a due process focus. Instead of an emphasis on children’s needs, the primary basis 
for sentencing under the new due process reform was the seriousness of offense and prior 
delinquent history. In his view, individualism became lost in the fight to treat children 
equitably as some argued (i.e. Feld, 1998) and, ironically, as discussed below, in the fight 
to get tough on crime, as others demanded (Le. Wilson, 1983).
Seriousness o f offense and prior offense history became the cornerstones o f “get 
tough” approaches to crime and delinquency in the 1980s and 1990s. Torbet and 
Szymanski (1998) state that the erosion of the rehabilitative ideal toward a more 
retributive model is illustrated though state legislative changes. Punitive policies enacted 
by legislatures during this time included waivers to adult court for juveniles who met 
certain criteria (i.e. committed violent crimes), statutory exclusion o f some crimes from
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juvenile court jurisdiction (i.e. murder), and “once an adult/always an adult” laws, 
wherein youth convicted in criminal court could not thereafter be charged in juvenile 
court for any subsequent offenses. As will be demonstrated later, tools to limit judicial 
discretion, such as the detention risk screening instrument, can be construed as part of 
this movement to consider legal variables, such as offense severity and prior offenses, as 
only the most relevant for court processing (See generally, Feeley and Simon, 1992), 
which may reflect more equal treatment for youth.
These legislative changes took some discretion away from the judges, yet, in and 
o f themselves, they cannot be equated with an overall more punitive juvenile court as 
some suggest (Feld, 1988; Torbet and Szymanski, 1998). Juvenile court practices also 
must be considered independently from legislative laws. While legislatures may be 
moving in a more punitive direction, an investigation of actual court practices is the only 
way to demonstrate if the court itself is following suit.
Family Court
With retributive policy changes toward juvenile offenders, it is perhaps 
remarkable that family courts and experimentation with these courts are proliferating 
(Moore and Wakeling, 1997 in Tonry). In the wake o f retributive approaches, family 
courts represent a return to the rehabilitative premise o f the court (Famworth, et al, 
1988). This may, in fact, signal a divorce between legislative codes and court practices. 
Legislative codes have inherently restricted judicial discretion. Meanwhile, family courts’ 
focus on rehabilitation corresponds to a necessary increase injudicial discretion. Some 
may view the legislative changes discussed above as politically conservative. Family
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court, on the other hand, with its focus on individual treatment, can be seen as politically 
liberal. That point is illuminated with a more detailed description of the family court.
The purpose o f family court is to treat the offender as embedded within the family 
system. Generally, family courts hear all juvenile and family cases, including 
delinquency, child abuse and neglect, divorce, domestic disputes, and probate. The court 
is structured so that the same judge hears all cases involving the same family. The belief 
is that if the judge knows more about the family, then better decisions will be made for 
that family. This process is intended to create an individualized, comprehensive approach 
for each family. While the first family court was started in 1914 (Mennel, 1973), the 
court never gained popularity until much later. Moore and Wakeling (1997, in Tonry) 
state that the idea of family court was ‘resurrected’ in 1959 due in large part to the 
advocacy of child-centered groups, including the National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, and the 
Children’s Bureau. These organizations believed that family court was the most 
appropriate way to address the best interests o f the child, while also improving family 
functioning.
Moore and Wakeling (1997, in Tonry) equated the family court model to the 
parens patriea doctrine. They further advocated that the family court model needed to be 
‘sold’ to the public, but in order to do so, it needed to be ‘repackaged’ to sound less like 
the Progressive model. The National Council on Juvenile and Family Court Judges has 
more recently advocated for family courts in their 1998 recommendations for 
improvement of the judicial system. They recommend that all jurisdictions move toward 
a unified family court so that family issues could be examined as a whole (National
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Council on Family and Juvenile Court Judges, 1998). Though the socio-political 
dynamics o f the renewed support for family court have not been traced, it is probably not 
a coincidence that advocacy o f this model occurred contemporaneously with the 
widespread criticism of the juvenile court system and the national attention to cases 
which would forever change the way cases were processed in the juvenile court system 
(i.e. In re Gault). As previously discussed, political legacies and influential actors not 
only may keep the court alive, but also may keep the rehabilitative ideal viable. If the 
family court is indeed a return to the rehabilitative ideal and a 'repackaging’ of 
Progressivism, then perhaps the movement can be characterized as “child saving” in the 
21s* century. The next section will examine New Hampshire’s experimentation with the 
family court system.
Historical Progression o f the New Hampshire Family Court
In 1993, the New Hampshire Judicial Council, an independent research body of 
the Executive Branch o f government, was commissioned to study the ways that family 
matters could be better served by the court system. After an investigation o f how other 
states handled family matters, the Council recommended implementing a unified family 
court system that would efficiently handle all cases relating to the family, and reduce the 
time between hearings for each case. The family court intended to represent a more 
holistic approach to serving families rather than the then traditional district court system 
in the state where juvenile cases and family cases were processed by whichever judge 
happened to be sitting on the day o f the docketed court case. They wrote:
The judicial system handling family matters must become, therefore, a 
manager o f services in a broad sense. It must evaluate the needs o f each 
family and allocate services in the way best suited to that family. It must not
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withdraw from its traditional role; rather, it must expand that role to include 
servicing the needs o f families in conflict as effectively as possible.
(Resolution ofFamily Issues in the Court Study Committee, p. 5)
Another New Hampshire report further described the family court’s heritage to 
rehabilitation and the child saving movement. The report stated that the creation o f the 
family court was “to provide ‘therapeutic justice’ to families in crisis. The hallmarks of 
‘therapeutic justice’ are fairness, protection and safety, less adversarial forms o f conflict 
resolution, individualized decision making, civility and family friendliness” (Carbon, 
Korbey, and Briggs, 1998, p. iii). In the same report, procedural safeguards were an 
expressed priority of the court. The report stated, “[bjenevolent intentions should not be 
allowed to mask unwarranted interference in family life, as it sometimes has in the past” 
(p. vi). Four goals described in this report were enacted as part of the New Hampshire 
family court law (See Appendix A for law): (1) comprehensive jurisdiction for all family 
matters (i.e. delinquency, divorce, probate, child abuse and neglect); (2) efficient 
administration (i.e. the same judge hearing all aspects of the same family’s cases; “one 
judge one family”); (3) court personnel with expertise and commitment to family issues; 
(4) comprehensive services for families (Le. providing some services, such as mediation 
and ‘triaging’ families to appropriate resources offered by public and private agencies).
Legislative law (Chapter 152:1 Laws o f 1995) created and appropriated funds for 
a pilot family court project in two counties. Inception of the project began on July 1, 
1996. For juvenile matters, cases from several district courts were consolidated into four 
family court locations in each county. Family court judges were selected by the state 
Supreme Court primarily on the basis o f interest and knowledge in family issues. Further
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training with judges and family court staff was made available by the State’s 
Administrative Office of the Courts.
An evaluation by an independent consultant one year after inception showed that 
clients who received services from family court and professionals working in the family 
court were generally satisfied with the new system (Solomon, 1997). The evaluation also 
revealed that the court was “successfully working toward” meeting its goals of reducing 
case processing time and of applying the principles o f “one family, one judge”. The 
consultant recommended that the pilot project be continued for another year and 
evaluated again at the end of that year.
In the same evaluation, however, surveys o f law enforcement, social workers, 
lawyers, and probation officers showed that the court was perceived to be of greater 
benefit for marital cases than for juvenile cases.1 Other evaluation results relating to 
juvenile cases demonstrated that 57% of professionals believed that family courts 
processed cases the same or more slowly than before the pilot project implementation. In 
interviews conducted with judges and family court staff analysis revealed that these 
court professionals believed that local district court judges who knew their communities 
may have had a greater impact on delinquency than family court judges who did not have 
as much knowledge of the same communities. In sum, survey results showed that there 
was some ambivalence in the utility of family court for delinquency matters. How that 
compared with empirical analysis of court outcomes was not addressed.
1 There was a 30% response rate for the surveys that the author concludes was “very good”, though others 
argue that obtaining a 60% response rate may be a bare minimum for validity (Fowler, 1988). Great caution 
must be taken in generalizing these results to all those who work with the family court. Nevertheless, the 
report assists in describing the evolution of the system.
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There were actually two follow-up evaluations to the first. The 1998 report cited 
previously showed that the court was meeting stated goals, particularly that of client 
satisfaction. Through surveys of court professionals and those availing themselves of 
court services, the authors of the report, two supervisory family court judges and the 
family court administrator, demonstrated staff and client satisfaction with the way cases 
were handled and recommended statewide expansion (Carbon et al., 1998).2 Yet another 
evaluation was conducted in the year 2000 by the Office of Legislative Budget Assistant. 
The Office of Legislative Budget Assistant was charged by the legislature to determine 
whether the family court continued to meet stated goals. The evaluation showed this to be 
the case, again using a survey methodology. The authors explicitly stated, however, that 
the additional costs to run family court should be taken into account when deciding its 
future. In the State’s 1998 fiscal year, those costs were $486,000 primarily for thirteen 
additional personnel (Office o f Legislative Budget Assistant, 2000).
The future of the family court in New Hampshire is uncertain. The pilot project, 
originally extended for one year, is now in its sixth year o f operation. Still, there are 
important issues that have not been addressed by these evaluations. As a reform effort, 
the family court was designed to improve family functioning and to meet the service 
needs of its clientele. Surveys have shown a measure of success with client satisfaction. 
Other questions about the court, specifically how and if its outputs differ from the district 
court system, have not been examined. This study assesses differences with regard to 
delinquency matters, and if there are differences, whether those variations can be
2 No survey methodology was discussed in this report. Response rate is unknown.
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perceived as a consequence of the rehabilitative orientation as previously discussed, or as 
a consequence of bureaucracy, which will be discussed later in the chapter.
Detention Reform Efforts 
Detention reform efforts include expediting case processing, limiting length of 
stays in detention, and almost invariably contain a screening instrument to reduce the 
number of youth who are placed in detention (Orlando, no date; DeMuro, no date). As 
one part of reform, risk assessment instruments (RAI) attempt to limit discretion by 
focusing on factors associated with recidivism. These factors involve a heavily, if not 
exclusive, reliance on present offense and prior offense history. As such, they seemingly 
stand in opposition to the family court notion o f individualism. The present study will 
examine bow this latter reform effort is handled in the family court system and in the 
district court system. First, however, it is important to understand how and why detention 
risk assessment instruments were developed.
Detention is a crucial stage in the juvenile justice process. Detention can occur at 
any time prior to court disposition. Generally speaking, there are three purposes for 
detention: 1) risk o f flight prior to court appearances; 2) risk to community safety, 3) risk 
o f personal harm (Krisberg and Austin, 1993); some studies conducted on detained youth, 
however, have found that low-level offenders who do not meet the above criteria are 
often detained (Guarino-Ghezzi and Loughran, 1996). In addition, many studies have 
found that detention of status offenders (youth who have committed offenses which, if 
they were adults, would not be considered crimes, such as running away) and 
disproportionate minority confinement are commonplace (Barton, Schwartz, and 
Orlando, 1994, in Schwartz and Barton, Eds.; Orlando and O’Brien, 1997; Poe-Yamagata
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and Butts, 1995). In 1994, federal legislation mandated that status offenders could not be 
detained with delinquents (the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1994). 
The federal position is that detention should be reserved for the most chronic and serious 
offenders (Howell, 1995). While state statutes comply with the federal position, the 
composition of detention centers often demonstrates a different reality (See Schwartz and 
Barton, Eds., 1994).
Risk assessment instruments have been used only recently at the juvenile 
detention level to address inappropriate placement, overcrowding, and disproportionate 
minority confinement, though these tools are not new to the criminal justice process. 
Screening tools have been used by parole boards to predict recidivism (See Klein and 
Caggiano, 1986), by probation to determine level o f surveillance (Howell, 1995), and by 
the judiciary to determine sentencing (ABA, 1974; Stith and Cabranes, 1998).
One detention decision making tool that has been used in Florida; Cook County, 
Illinois; Sacramento County, California; Multnomah County, Oregon; New York City; 
and now New Hampshire, is the risk assessment instrument (RAI) developed by those 
involved in the Florida Detention Initiative (Barton, et a l, 1994, in Schwartz and Barton, 
Eds.) and modeled after detention reform recommendations by the National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency (See Baird, 1984). While the original instrument was based on 
factors correlated with detention risk, subsequent uses of the instrument have included a 
normative component in which stakeholders have added categories felt to be important 
policy concerns in their jurisdictions (Orlando, no date). For example, New Hampshire 
has added an open ended “aggravating factors” section. With funds from the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation, the instrument was first piloted in Broward County, Florida. The
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development of the instrument was initiated because of a detention overcrowding lawsuit. 
The lawsuit was a catalyst for political action. Pilot data showed that the instrument 
achieved positive results: fewer youth were detained and fewer low risk offenders were 
placed in detention.
Based on the RAl’s success in Broward County, in 1990 the Florida legislature 
mandated its use throughout the state. A policy analysis o f statewide implementation two 
years later showed that the instrument had been further “refined”. Those changes allowed 
for more discretionary decision making and, as a result, the overall detention population 
increased once again, though not to the level it was prior to the instrument’s inception 
(Bazemore, 1998; also see Frazier and Lee, 1992). At present, the detention population in 
Florida has swelled to levels similar to what they were prior to instrument 
implementation (Orlando, 2002). Other sites, however, have had continued success in the 
use of their versions of the RAI (Annie E. Casey Foundation, 1999).
Historical Progression in New Hampshire
The State o f New Hampshire has recently adopted the instrument adding its own 
normative component to reflect their policy concerns. This includes the aggravating 
factor section as previously mentioned as well as different ‘offense severity’ scoring 
schemes based on state offense severity categories. The RAI is being piloted in two 
counties and is being evaluated by the researcher. To property evaluate the instrument, it 
is useful to understand its historical progression in New Hampshire.
In 1995, concerned with detention overcrowding and the outcry from certain groups 
for more detention beds, a  statewide task force commissioned an analysis of the Youth 
Detention Services Unit (YDSU). YDSU is the State’s only pre-disposition detention
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facility. The co-ed facility has a total o f 23 beds, but is often overcapacity, though the 
commissioned report stated an average daQy population of 19 youth. Based on a review 
of YDSU records, the final report pointed out that over two-thirds (69%) of youth 
detained were low level, misdemeanor offenders who did not need to be securely 
detained (Orlando and O’Brien, 1997). The report recommendations were to implement a 
screening criteria for detention (i.e. RAI) and to create alternatives to secure detention, 
such as day reporting centers. Three and a half years after the release of that document, 
the State, with funds from the Casey Foundation, began the process o f implementing and 
evaluating the first recommendation.
The report was not received without criticism. The current YDSU Intake 
Coordinator, who was also in the same position during the study period, points out that 
the population of the detention center ebbs and flows with juvenile delinquent activity.
The study only examined the average daily population of the facility for the first four 
months o f 1997. These tend to be slower months for detention admission. She states that 
the report’s average daily population of 19 cannot be generalized to the rest o f the year as 
juvenile activity typically picks up in the late spring and again in late summer and early 
foil (W.C., personal communication 2/28/01).
Moreover, the report foiled to address one of the overriding considerations for the 
scrutiny o f detention centers— the issue o f minority overrepresentation. Although the 
stakeholders (in this case the New Hampshire Task Force on Crime) may not have 
requested an analysis o f discriminatory practices, the report revealed some alarming 
figures. Hispanics represented 7% o f detained youth, yet New Hampshire’s population is 
only 1% Hispanic (Bureau of the Census, 1990). Four percent o f detainees were black,
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yet New Hampshire's population is only Vi% black. Asians represented 2% of the 
detained population, while New Hampshire’s population is only .8% Asian. While these 
figures equate to small raw numbers and do not represent prima facie evidence o f 
discrimination, they do signal a need for further investigation.
Finally, it should be noted that some members of the New Hampshire Task Force 
who commissioned the study were never notified o f the results (Judge A., personal 
communication 2/23/01). Failure to communicate results may undermine the success of 
initiatives (Weiss, 1998). In the present study, some of the court personnel involved in 
the project have little, if any, awareness o f the logic behind the screening tool and the 
reason for its pilot in the State (Judge H., personal communication 1/19/01). Failure to 
understand initiatives can also play a large role in the acceptance or resistance of new 
policy initiatives (Weiss, 1998).
Previous evaluation studies o f detention risk screening instruments have used 
process and outcome measures (Maupin and Bond-Maupin, 1999; also see Schwartz and 
Barton, Eds., 1994), but have not examined them within the broader context of case 
processing. How this screening tool, which runs counter to an individualized approach, is 
utilized by family court and district court will be examined here, along with other court 
processing outcomes.
Court Processing Studies 
Most court processing studies focus on sentencing outcomes. Sociological study 
o f sentencing outcomes has been conducted from the early 1960s to the present. Very 
limited research, however, examines the intermediary court outcome processes. Though
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not an exhaustive list, four intermediary outcomes will be examined here: case processing 
time, length of detention stay, plea bargaining, and court ordered assessments. 
Intermediary Outcomes
Case Processing Time. While no national statistics are available on case 
processing time, one broad study addressed length of time in processing cases in 123 
counties across the U.S. (Butts, 1994). In this study, the author found that the median 
time to process cases from the filing of a petition to the disposition o f a case ranged from 
36-171 days. In a follow up study, Butts and his colleague surveyed juvenile justice 
professionals on their opinions about case delays (Butts and Halemba, 1994). Using 
factors gathered from studies on adult courts, they asked professionals to rate juvenile 
court delay problems. Juvenile court workers cited all the problems associated with adult 
court: high workloads, poor organizational arrangements, inefficient courtroom 
procedures, and indifferent staff attitudes (p. 37). Unfortunately, the authors did not 
attempt empirical analyses to compare workers’ perceptions with actual case flow. As 
mentioned, almost one half of all states have two different juvenile court systems in 
operation within them. Logically, case processing time may vary by court structure. One 
of the stated goals o f the New Hampshire family court was to reduce the length of time 
between court hearings. This study will examine if family court does indeed differ from 
district court on case processing time for delinquent offenses.
Detention Stay. Length of detention stay is predicted on court practices. Courts in 
New Hampshire determine who gets into detention and when they get out of detention. 
While there may be a high correlation between length of court case and length of 
detention stay, length of detention stay is important on its own though most research
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examines detention as an in/out decision in order to model the sentencing process. 
Detention involves more than simply entering and leaving. Ultimately, detention is a loss 
of liberty. During secure confinement, offenders are away from their families, their 
schools and out of the community. Rosner (1988) has called detention a period o f‘forced 
idleness’. Meanwhile other studies have begun to document detention’s negative 
psychological impact (See for example, Bookin-Weiner, 1984) Clearly, length of stay is 
an important issue related to court practices that has received little empirical 
investigation. As a function o f those court practices, length of detention stay, similar to 
length of time in the court process, may vary by court system.
Plea Bargaining. According to Sanborn (1992), researchers barely acknowledge 
that plea bargaining occurs in juvenile court, yet plea bargaining is a product of court 
action. In one of the first and only studies, Sanborn (1993) examined plea bargaining in 
rural, suburban, and urban areas. He distinguished between sentence bargains, where a 
plea is obtained for a reduced sentence, and charge bargains, where a plea is obtained for 
reduced charges. He found that sentencing bargains were more accepted in urban areas 
than in rural or suburban areas. Based on these findings, he argued that suburban and 
rural judges were more unwilling to surrender their control than their urban counterparts. 
Bortner (1982) also acknowledged that plea bargaining existed in his in-depth 
examination of one suburban court. In this court, he found that charge bargaining and 
sentence bargaining melded together and could not be considered separately. Rather than 
conduct a more detailed analysis o f plea bargains, Bortner utilized pleas as a control 
variable (yes/no) in an overall sentencing model. Sanborn (1992,1993) argues that plea 
bargains are an important outcome and should be examined as more than a yes/no
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decision in sentencing models. Clearly, more research needs to be conducted to redress 
the paucity of literature in this area.
Assessments. There has been a similar absence of literature on court ordered 
evaluations and assessments, which are part of case processing. One possible reason for 
lack of examination is that most case processing studies rely almost exclusively on 
computerized court files which often may not include information about evaluations and 
assessments that were completed on the child or the child’s family. One Ontario study 
that examined actual case records found that although judges ordered evaluations, they 
rarely followed clinical recommendations (Bell, 1994). Of concern in the present study is 
not whether or not judges follow clinical recommendations; rather the interest is in 
whether or not the judicial ordering o f assessments varies by court type and how 
theoretical strains of rehabilitation and bureaucracy may play a role in that variation. 
Dispositional Outcome
Finding o f dispositional outcomes, or sentencing outcomes, have shown mixed 
results. As will be discussed, many studies have found more severe treatment for 
minority youth, lower class youth, and girls, while a smaller portion have found no 
evidence of discrimination. Variation in results is due to many factors. Hagan, Hewitt, 
and Alwin (1979) attribute the lack of consistent findings and the large amount of 
unexplained variance to the loose coupling of the justice system wherein different 
subsystems have the ability to influence outcomes. Beyond coupling, factors that account 
for the variation in sentencing foldings include issues of theory and method. A number of 
different theoretical viewpoints have been used in sentencing studies thereby influencing 
the variables that have been included in court processing models. Methodological
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differences have led to different results. More current studies used regression techniques, 
and earlier studies used bivariate analyses.
A review of the literature points to two distinct factors, one substantive and one 
methodological that have influenced studies of court processing. Substantively, In re 
Gault, which entitled youth to the Sixth Amendment right to an attorney, has demanded 
that the court to pay closer attention to legal factors (Feld, 1990; Thomson and McAnay, 
1984, in McAnay, Thomson, and Fogel; also see Lemert, 1970a). As a result, pre-Gault 
and post-Gault courts may vary markedly in how they process juveniles.
Methodologically, the development and use of multivariate techniques 
consistently has shown that the most reliable and valid models of court processing need 
to control for other factors. Early quantitative studies that do not use multivariate 
techniques may not represent an accurate picture of court processing. For these reasons, 
this review examines only post-Gault studies that, when analyzing quantitative data, have 
used multivariate techniques.
Qualitative Studies. Generally, studies that have examined the juvenile court 
through systematic observation have enhanced an understanding o f how courts operate. 
Early observers writing about the same tune included Cicorurel (1968), Emerson (1969), 
and Lemert (1970a). Their findings, however, are not consistent. In his observational 
study of one urban court, Emerson (1969) concluded that the judge was the main decision 
maker in the court. Lemert (1970a), on the other hand, believed that urbanization, 
especially after World War II, transformed the court into a complex organization that no 
longer reflected the characteristics o f a sitting judge. Lemert also triangulated his 
observation of several courts with interviews, surveys, and file reviews of courts around
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the State of California. He concluded that the California juvenile court system evolved 
from informal justice based on humanitarianism and judicial decisions to another type of 
informal justice predicated by ecological factors, administrative considerations, and 
specialized group interaction. Cicorurel (1968) echoed the interaction theme. In his 
examination of one court from an ethnomethodological approach, he demonstrated a 
negotiated order between court actors, rather than a single, powerful judicial actor.
In a more recent study, Bortner (1982) observed court cases, interviewed decision 
makers, and statistically analyzed court records in one mid-western, suburban court. He 
concluded that the juvenile court is a complex organization: “Even when one is familiar 
with the general organizational structure, basic philosophy, and statutes regarding 
juveniles, each court represents a unique approach to the implementation of legislative 
edicts” (p. 16). Although he defined decision making as a subjective human process, he 
believed that decisions were made in the context of the larger community. In contrast to 
Lemert (1970a) and Cicorurel (1968), he asserted that individualized justice had taken a 
back seat to bureaucratized, assembly-line justice in which court actors as well as 
juveniles and their families did not meaningfully participate in the process. Bortner’s 
observation on bureaucracy points to a common problem o f many studies: although he 
discussed the idea of bureaucratized justice, he failed to operationalize its concepts.
Theoretical perspective provides a method of organizing quantitative research on 
dispositional outcome. The concept o f bureaucracy, borrowed from organizational 
sociology, is discussed as a contribution to court processing discourse.
Conflict Perspective. A broad characterization o f the conflict school includes 
feminist research and social ecology as subgroups. The conflict approach focuses on the
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effects of inequality in society. Although varied in its forms, the basic tenets of conflict 
theory contend that those with greater access to resources wield greater social control 
over those with fewer resources. Contemporary conflict approaches tend to view society 
as pluralistic, believing that there is not just one group vying for power, but many (See 
Walker, Spohn, and DeLone, 2000 for relation to the criminal justice system). In a 
juvenile court framework, conflict theory suggests that minorities, such as non-white 
youth, girls, and lower class youth will be treated more severely that white male youth. 
Support for this approach in case processing literature has been mixed (Hansenfeld, 1976, 
in Sarri and Hansenfeld; Leiber and Jamieson, 1995; Pope and Feyerherm, 1990; Thomas 
and Fitch, 1975).
Many scholars assert that race, gender, and class cannot be considered 
independently (Chesney-Lind, 1988; Daly, 1998 in Tonry; Miller, 1994, in Schwartz and 
Milovanovie). These scholars believe that race, gender, and class variables are 
inextricably intertwined and attempts to disentangle their effects could lead to biased 
results. Nevertheless, because o f such things as difficulty obtaining large samples and 
relatively homogenous groups of offenders, even these scholars continue to examine or 
emphasize specific variables as will be shown below.
In a methodologically sophisticated study, McCarthy and Smith (1986) sought to 
explain the variance in juvenile court dispositions by controlling for whether or not youth 
were detained and for decisions made at previous points in the justice process. They 
examined race, gender, and class during the phases of referral, adjudication, and 
disposition. They found that as cases move through the system, race and social class 
became more salient while legal factors, such as offense severity, declined in importance.
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This supports Barton’s (1976) early review of research where he found that the present 
offense lessened in importance as youth proceeded through the system.
In contrast, Phillips and Dinitz (1982) found that legal variables have more 
importance in sentencing than social characteristics. These scholars couched their study 
in terms of legal and social characteristic, or extra-legal, determinants of disposition. In 
their examination of violent offender dispositions in one court, they found that social 
characteristics (race, gender, class) did not influence court decisions. The most influential 
variable was the legal variable of prior record.
On the other hand, other conflict-oriented or critical criminologists that have 
examined racial effects have found a more nuanced effect. These scholars have found that 
race was a factor in pre-trial detention and that while race had little direct effect on 
subsequent court processing, detention had a large influence (Bishop and Frazier, 1988; 
Frazier and Bishop, 1995 in Leonard, Pope, and Feyerherm; Leonard and Sontheimer, 
1995, in Leonard, et al.; Thoraberry, 1979). Reasons for the discrepancies among these 
studies may be due to methodological approach and geography. For example, Phillips and 
Dinitz (1982) only examined violent offender dispositions in one court while Bishop and 
Frazier’s collaboration (Le. 1988; 1992; 1996) has modeled the phases of referral, 
arraignment, adjudication, and disposition for all alleged delinquents in an entire state 
(Florida). It is difficult to reconcile these studies when they take such varied approaches 
to the subject.
Leiber and Jamieson (1995) conducted a very comprehensive analysis of juvenile 
processing in four urban counties in Iowa from a “revised conflict perspective” that 
examined racial stereotypes, thereby adding an attitudinal component to their sentencing
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research. They analyzed case level factors, community factors, and attitudinal factors of 
decision makers (judges, prosecutors, probation officers, court workers). The authors 
were particularly interested in how punishment orientations and stereotypes by decision 
makers played a role in racial disparities in sentencing. They found that the effects of race 
were not routinely significant. Racial disparities were contingent upon decision makers’ 
perceptions of punishment in the juvenile justice system as well as their perceptions of 
minorities. These authors examined variables at multiple levels, not just case factors.
They showed that judicial orientation may be an important variable in case processing 
analysis (but see Hansenfeld and Cheung, 1985).
In comprehensive review o f research relating to race, Pope and Feyerherm (1990) 
examined court processing studies from 1970*1988 and found that race operated in three 
different ways. First, race operated indirectly as decision-makers used other criteria 
associated with race to make decisions, such as family status or school participation.
Race also operated cumulatively as a determining factor in each stage of the court 
process. Finally, race operated geographically as there were fewer community options for 
juvenile delinquents in areas with large minority populations. This study serves as an 
excellent summary of the literature, pointing to reasons why findings about the 
interaction of race in the juvenile justice system are so mixed. Ultimately, the operation 
of race is vague and may vary by location. What is clear, however, is that race should be 
a variable in any case processing study.
Carter and Clelland (1979) argued that when class is appropriately 
operationalized, race foils to be an important variable in sentencing. They took a neo- 
Marxian view o f social reality. In their study, they conceptualized class dichotomously as
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the iumpenprolitariate’, or those not working, and the ‘stable working class’. They 
further divided offenses into those o f moral order (Le. drugs, sex) and traditional (i.e. 
offenses against person and property). They found that lower class youth received more 
severe sentences when crimes were of the moral order, and they reasoned that was 
because society could not depend on socialization of the lower class to occur in primary 
groups, such as the family. The authors argued that the intersection of class and crime, 
not necessarily race, must be examined in more sophisticated ways in future research in 
order to fully test the conflict perspective.
Feminist Theory. Feminist research is included under the conflict perspective 
because feminist theory has tended to draw on elements o f conflict theory (i.e. Hart sock, 
1998; Smith, 1990). These scholars underscore the intersection of race, gender, and class 
(Flavin, 1998, in Ross; Miller, 1994 m Schwartz and Milovanovic; Naffine, 1987).
A particular focus within feminist research has been on status offender differences 
between boys and girls. Chesney-Lind and Shelden (1992) documented the juvenile 
court’s historic discrimination against girls, particularly with regard to status offenses 
where girls were consistently treated more harshly than boys. The authors conceptualized 
the juvenile justice system as one that harbors a double standard: a system for boys that 
was concerned with justice, and another for girls that was concerned with their morality. 
The influence of race further confounded that justice track. Their research, however, 
focused on status offenders, making little mention o f how the landscape changed with 
more serious offenders.
Johnson and Scheuble (1991) examined both status and delinquency offenses. 
They found that traditional sex role conflict in sentencing had application for less serious
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offenses, such as status offenses, but not necessarily more serious offenses. Similar to the 
research cited above (Chesney-Lind and Shelden, 1992; also see Chesney-Lind, 1997), 
they found that status offenders were given more severe sentences. Moreover, girls who 
were repeat offenders were also given more severe sentences than boys because of their 
violation of gender role expectations. For all other offenses, the authors found elements 
of paternalism, in which girls were treated more leniently than boys. Other feminists 
(Flavin, 1998, in Ross; Simpson, 1989) argue that feminist research needs to move 
beyond the simplistic conceptualization o f sex role conflict and the paternalism/chivalry 
debate to take into account social constructs of female crime which are necessarily rooted 
in masculine-defined reality.
Finally, some feminist research provides different findings depending on the 
method used. Miller’s (1994, in Schwartz and MOovanovic) work suggests subtle and 
indirect bias against minority youth. In her examination o f probation recommendations 
for disposition, Miller, using log-linear analysis, found no racial bias in the treatment of 
delinquent girls. Qualitative results of probation officer dispositional reports, however, 
suggested that class and gender-centered minority expectations pervaded the 
recommendations o f probation officers. There were different expectations for white girls, 
as opposed to Latinas, as opposed to blacks. In sum, different feminist frameworks and 
different methods have shown some measure of gender disparity. Studies conducted 
outside o f a feminist lens, on the other hand, have not necessarily shown a gender bias 
(Le. Fader, et a l, 2001; Jacobs, 1990).
Social Ecology. Social ecologists emphasize the community as a context for 
decision making. This view strongly focuses on community level factors that account for
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variation. Lauristen and Sampson (1998, in Tonry) assert that community context helps 
interpret the race-crime association, and how the macrosocial contexts such as poverty or 
urbanization affect sentencing decisions. The authors also state that decision makers 
respond to the social conditions of the area and variation in decision making can be 
differentiated by ecological contexts. Such things as access to quality jobs, to 
marriageable partners, and to quality schools can affect justice system outcomes (Wilson, 
1978; Elliot, et al., 1996). Social ecologists posit that, rather than overt ethnic or class 
bias, social conditions that disproportionately affect minorities (Le. joblessness and 
poverty) exert their influence through family disruption (Sampson and Groves, 1989). 
Family disruption, in turn, affects how courts view offenders (Berger and Hoffinan, 1995; 
Daly, 1989,1994; See review by Pope and Feyerherm, 1990).
In their study of youthful confinement, Bridges, Conley, Engen and Price- 
Spratten (1995, in Leonard, et al.) state, “Among the most significant o f the limitations 
[of previous research] is that studies typically overlook important regional or areal 
differences in the administration o f juvenfie justice that may contribute to disparities in 
confinement” (p., 129). They found that minorities were more likely to be confined in 
communities with high violent crime rates. They also found that disproportionate 
minority confinement was related to officials’ perceptions of crime and minorities. The 
authors’ point to the need to integrate structural information into analysis of decision 
making.
Related to community variables, such as crime rate and access to quality 
institutions, is access to and availability of options and alternatives for juveniles who are 
identified by agents o f social control Krisberg and Austin (1993) logically point out that
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court intake decisions are made largely on the availability of existing resources. Emerson 
(1969) notes that case outcomes are contingent, in part, on practical matters, particularly 
outside services which affect the range of possibilities of what can be done (Also see 
MacDonald and Chesney-Lind, 2001 and Pope and Feyerherm, 1990). In a recent study, 
Fader, et al. (2001) found that the strongest factor associated with the decision to commit 
a juvenile to out-of-home placement was the youth’s history of drug abuse. While the 
authors mention in passing that lack of programming may be related to the results, the 
availability of drug programs may be much greater in the geographical area under study 
(in this case Philadelphia) than other types of treatment options. Judges thus would be 
more likely to sentence youth to out-of-home drug treatment programs because the option 
is available and in absence of other programs. Social ecologists take this sort of resource 
availability as well as other ecological variables discussed above into account in analyses.
Penal Theory. Scholars that have examined court processing through a penal 
theory orientation have general examined the issue from a retributive/punitive versus 
rehabilitative/therapeutic dichotomy. In reality, the degree to which individuals and/or 
courts are retributive or rehabilitative frills on a continuum. Generally, it is argued that 
courts adhering to a rehabilitative approach, or the original conception of parens patriae, 
are more likely to be discriminatory because o f the wide discretion that key actors use in 
deciding cases. Feld (1998, in Tonry) notes, “To the extent that parens patriae ideology 
legitimates individualization and differential processing, it exposes ‘disadvantaged’ 
youths to the prospects of more extensive state intervention” (p. 532). Penal theory has 
been used to examine processing both at the court and the individual level. There are two 
major flaws with these studies. First, some assume that legislative edicts predict court
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practices (i.e. Cohen and Khiegel, 1979). In reality, court practices may differ markedly 
from legislative mandates (Bortner, 1982). Punitive changes in juvenile law may have 
occurred, but that does not necessarily translate to actual punitive court practices. Second, 
post-hoc explanations are often used to describe court practices. That is, the degree to 
which empirical analysis shows legal factors to be more important than extra-legal factors 
justifies court orientation (i.e. Feld, 1991). These studies may, to some extent, explain 
how courts are operating, but do not explain why courts are operating in such a manner.
In order to explain why, penal orientation must be justified beforehand.
Clarke and Koch (1980) analyzed two metropolitan courts in one state and found 
evidence to categorize the juvenile court as oriented toward crime control rather than 
toward rehabilitation. The based their categorization on results that showed that legal 
factors, such as offense severity, were more likely to influence disposition than social 
factors such as gender, class, and race.
In another early study o f court processing, Cohen and Kluegel (1979a) used log- 
linear analysis to determine differential intake decisions by probation officers in two 
courts in two different states. One court was oriented toward due process, while the other 
was more rehabilitative/therapeutic. The basis o f court orientation distinction was the 
degree to which juvenile courts adhered to adult court rules and procedures imposed by 
law in each state. The most important factors in decision making were type o f offense, as 
well as gender, and the guiding court philosophy. Overall, the due process court was 
more likely to treat all juveniles more punitively. For specific types o f offenses (Le. 
alcohol and drug violations), females were likely to be treated more harshly in both
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courts. Though not fully addressed in their discussion, legislative mandates do not appear 
to uniformly or overwhelmingly predict court practices.
Among more recent penal studies, Mears and Field (2000) used penal theory to 
examine dispositions in one juvenile court. To frame their study, they used the distinction 
often made in research at the adult court level between substantive and procedural justice. 
They defined substantive justice as taking into account the needs o f the offender, as 
morally based, and as akin to the rehabilitation approach used by other juvenile court 
researchers. They defined procedural justice, on the other hand, as formal and 
bureaucratic adhering to due process concerns. The authors found that while the juvenile 
court process was complex and nuanced, more severe sentences resulted from the legal 
variables o f more serious present offenses and prior records and that social characteristics 
did not play a large role in decision making. They found that blacks received less severe 
sanctions than whites; that there was little gender influence on sentence severity; and that 
age explained little in dispositional outcome for youth who were not eligible to be waived 
to adult court for offenses.
Ultimately, they determined that procedural justice had taken hold in this one 
metropolitan juvenile court. They, however, did not control for many factors beyond race, 
gender, and class. Substantive justice by definition takes into account more factors than 
that. Thus, their model may have been misspecified, and it may have been premature to 
assume the court was more procedural^ rational without more controls in the model.
Feld (1991) examined the degree to which courts rely on punitive or rehabilitative - 
orientation based on geography in one state. He found that in rural locations, courts 
tended to be more informal, more treatment oriented, and, in these locations, judges used
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wide discretion in deciding cases. In urban areas, the opposite resulted; courts were more 
bureaucratic and oriented toward due process rights. He argued that the more a court was 
oriented toward bureaucracy and due process, the more likely it was to be punitive. 
Conversely, the more informal and less concerned with due process rights a court was, 
the more likely it was to be treatment oriented (also see Burruss and Leonard, 2000).
Feld (1991) then believes that justice by geography is the most relevant factor. 
Geographic location determines penal orientation; yet geographic location is predicated 
on the degree of bureaucratization. Thus, his logic then is that bureaucratization 
determines punitiveness (also see Hagan, 1977). His analysis, like a previously discussed 
study (Bortner, 1982) suffers from the poorly defined concept o f bureaucratization. He 
used urbanization as a proxy for bureaucratization. While urban areas may be more 
efficient and rational than rural areas, that proposition must be examined. Myers and 
Talarico (1986) point out that urbanization and bureaucratization are not equivalent.
This connection between penal theory and bureaucratization is intriguing, 
particularly in the present study. As will be shown, the family court is more 
bureaucratically organized than the district court, but its ostensible purpose is more 
rehabilitative. Before looking at that conundrum, bureaucracy within the context of court 
practices must first be more fully explored.
OrpflniTational Studies. An organizational approach to the sociological issue of 
decision making may assist in adding clarity to court processing research. Many court 
processing and sentencing researchers have discussed the necessity o f adding 
organizational measures to any future analysis (i.e. Leiber and Jamieson, 1995; Mears 
and Field, 2000; Sampson, 1986; Stapleton, Aday, and Ito, 1982). Sampson and Laub
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(1993) note, “There is a growing body of research suggesting that organizational 
structure of the court and resource allocations are important in understanding court 
variations in detention and commitment” (p. 307). Despite this need, most studies 
continue to fail to take organizational measures into account. The organizational 
approach is premised on the notion that the organizational culture mediates court 
processing outcomes, although there are different variations of organizational theory.
There have been only a handful o f studies that have used an organizational 
approach or borrowed from organizational theory in the study of court processing. Most 
of those studies have been conducted in adult courts, which may not translate to what 
occurs in juvenile courts. These studies also have not included penal theory as a 
complementary approach to court processing.
In one of the most well-known studies, Nardulli (1978) and Eisenstein and Jacob 
(1987) discussed what they term the “courtroom workgroup” as ultimately determining 
how cases are processed. The courtroom workgroup consisted of an elitist group of the 
judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney who all negotiated in the ruling of the 
courtroom. In this paradigm, power is conceptualized monolithically as an elitist group 
controlling the courtroom in their own best interest. This conceptualization does not leave 
room for the idea that various groups, elitist or not, and individuals vie for power (i.e. 
Foucault, 1980). This view also presupposed a tight coupling in which the courtroom 
elite control other aspects of the system. As previously discussed, the juvenile court is 
more likely to be characterized as loosely-coupled, and the assumption of tight coupling 
may not be an empirical reality.
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In contrast, Hansenfeld and Cheung (1985) used a political economy perspective, 
in which different groups engage in negotiating scarce resources to explain court 
processing, or as they term it, “people processing”. While they conceptualized power 
more broadly, Hansenfeld and Cheung did not consistently find support for this 
theoretical perspective in empirical analysis.
Finally, using concepts borrowed from the organizational theory of neo­
institutionalism, Albonetti (1991) examined the idea of bounded rationality in the 
criminal (adult) court system. Although she used no other organizational measures, she 
found that in the face of uncertainty about who will recidivate, judges patterned their 
decisions based on stereotypical notions of who has recidivated in the past. As Bell and 
Lang (1985) note, stereotyping generally is considered to be consistent with rationality in 
the economics literature. The above studies demonstrate the utility of using 
organizationally theory for understanding criminal justice processes. This particular study 
will examine elements of bureaucracy.
Weber is widely considered to be the founder o f organizational theory and 
originator o f ideas about how bureaucracy operates. Writing in the early 20* century, 
Weber believed that the modem world was becoming increasingly more rational and 
more bureaucratized. Rationality and bureaucracy, Weber thought, occurred in tandem A 
formal system of rationality invaded the political, economic, and administrative realms of 
individuals’ social lives. A modem system of organization was formed based on abstract 
rules, or formal rationality, rather than on the traditional, patrimonial system of personal 
ties and values, or substantive rationality. Bureaucracy, because it was predictable,
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quantifiable, and efficient (Rhzer, 1993), was the most capable form of government able 
to handle an increasingly globalize world that needed to meld pluralities.
According to Weber, characteristics of bureaucracy included fixed jurisdictional 
authority managed by written documents; general rules guiding interactions; and 
specialization of tasks, or a division of labor (Weber, 1958). Weber believed that 
bureaucracy promoted rationality and regularity. Under such a system, discretion and 
individualism fell by the wayside.
In the arena of law, general rules applying universalistic criteria resulted from the 
demand for equality and elimination o f case-by-case decision making:44 ‘Equality before 
the law’ and the demand for legal guarantees against arbitrariness demand a formal and 
rational ‘objectivity’ of administration, as opposed to the personally free discretion 
flowing from the ‘grace’ o f the old patrimonial domination” (Weber, 1958, p. 220). In 
patrimonial systems, tasks were carried out by individuals who left their mark on 
organizations. In a bureaucratic world, individuals performed specialized tasks, but the 
power to leave indelible marks was gone. Thus, in Weber’s view, modem law was meted 
out consistently based on general principles o f formal rationality, and not on the 
idiosyncratic nature o f individuals or places of substantive rationality.
Juvenile justice processing may very well be a microcosm of Weberian 
rationality. The historical beginnings o f the court show a very patrimonial construction of 
justice. Discretion and individualization were the cornerstones of the juvenile court and 
the rehabilitative ideal Individual judges were extremely influential in their own courts 
(Le. Mack, 1909). Over time, the rehabilitative ideal was limited by procedural 
safeguards and by urbanization. Case law, analogous to Weber’s idea o f general rules,
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created standards of procedure that regulated judges’ decisions. An artifact of 
urbanization has been the need to process more juveniles through the court system. As a 
result, organizational assembly-line justice has been the most efficient way to deal with 
heavy caseloads (Bortner, 1982). A new system, such as an implementation of a risk 
screening tool, presents a cog in the wheel of efficient justice and may therefore be met 
with resistance. This new system, however, is borne out of a rational procedure of 
calculability and prediction through automation, not human estimation. On the other 
hand, a family court system is a return to discretion and individualization, but a more 
bureaucratized system, in Weber’s view, would overpower such ideals.
The organizational context of bureaucracy has been used in a few previous studies 
o f juvenile court processing to examine case outcome. Most of these studies look at 
decision making in terms of a traditional, rehabilitative versus bureaucratic system of 
court administration (Bortner, 1982; Dixon, 1995; Feld, 1991; Hagan, 1977; Phillips and 
Dinitz, 1982). With the exception of Dixon (1995), a consistent problem with these 
studies has been the operationalization o f the term “bureaucracy”. Most studies equate 
urbanization to bureaucratization, either examining population density or court caseload. 
These two attributes may not measure the same underlying concepts, and if they do 
measure bureaucracy, they may not do so exhaustively. While bureaucratization may be 
difficult to measure fully (Dixon, 1995), increasing refinement o f bureaucratic measures 
may provide a stronger foundation in understanding court processing. Prior measures of 
bureaucracy include the degree to which courts operate efficiently or their workload 
status; the degree to which courts are decentralized; and the number of specialized
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personnel involved with the court (Dixon, 1995; Myers and Talarico, 1986; Tepperman, 
1973).
As mentioned, penal theory approaches may compliment a discussion of 
organizational influences. Scholars who have utilized a penal philosophy perspective 
(Cohen, 1975; Cohen and Khiegel, 1979a; Feld, 1991) often discuss urbanization as 
affecting court structure which, in turn, affects the degree to which court sentencing is 
oriented toward punishment or rehabilitation. They do so, however, without examining 
organisational measures. These studies may be using tautological reasoning in assuming 
that a court is either punitive or rehabilitative in the absence of such measures. Rather 
than being based on implicit assumptions about court organization, a refined 
operationalization o f elements o f bureaucracy may provide a more grounded approach to 
examining case processing.
Overall, the idea of bureaucracy may have positive consequences for charges of 
discriminatory juvenile justice processing. Youth processed in more bureaucratic courts 
may be less likely to be discriminated against because of the need for efficient, and as a 
by-product, uniform administration of justice. Individual traits give way to general 
principles and a system that is concerned with equality and the larger foray of 
maintaining social order. The RAI in New Hampshire would appear to fit nicety with a 
bureaucratic rationale. The court reform effort, in contrast, appears to be at odds with 
such a structure.
Bureaucracy and Rehabilitation
An inherent tension exists between the penal idea o f rehabilitation and 
individualization and the organizational idea o f bureaucracy and standardization. Lemert
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(1970b, in Garabedian and Gibbons) believed that “bureaucratic procedures [are] 
antithetical to individualized treatment” (147). Moore and Wakeling (1997, in Tonry) 
empirically demonstrated one problem with the wedding of bureaucracy and 
rehabilitation ideals using Rhode Island family court as an example. They stated, “In 
effect, a principle o f bureaucratic rationality governing the fair and efficient delivery of 
overall services is coming into conflict with a judicial determination of what justice 
demands in individual cases” (284). A family court that is bureaucratized but espouses 
individual treatment is problematic both theoretically and empirically. Figure 2 illustrates 
the characteristics of each theoretical strain.
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As discussed there are several characteristics of a more bureaucratized system. 
Weber (1942) identifies several hallmarks of bureaucracy: standardization of procedures, 
specialization of personnel, hierarchical decision making, and formality in process. Those 
scholars that that have translated Weber’s ideas of bureaucratization into a court context 
add further elements o f more bureaucratized court systems. Aday (1986) added that 
bifurcation of the court process is symbolic of the formality characteristic of more 
bureaucratized systems and should be used to measure the degree of bureaucracy. In a 
bifurcated court process, each phase (Le. adjudication, disposition) o f the court process is 
a separate hearing.3 Dixon (1995) included that a docket specific court structure -  in 
which the same judge hears all aspects o f the same family’s court case -  as a further 
characteristic o f more bureaucratized court systems.
The New Hampshire family court system embodies the problematic nature of 
bureaucracy and rehabilitation. It involves elements o f a more bureaucratic system than 
the traditional district court system, and it is ostensibly focused on rehabilitation. The 
rehabilitative purpose of the family court has been discussed, and the greater degree of 
bureaucracy of family court can be divided into two categories: structure and personnel. 
With regard to structure, and in contrast to district courts, the family court is docket 
specific, there are standardized rules and procedures about file handling, and there are 
significantly more bifurcated hearings. With regard to personnel, and in contrast to the 
district courts, family courts have specialized ‘family court’ judges and county 
coordinators who provide direction and oversight o f all courts in the county. Figure 3 
illustrates these conceptual ideas graphically.
3 As shown in Figure 1, New Hampshire allows for hearings to be combined to allow for a summary 
disposition.
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In sum, this study examines if there are differences between the family court and 
the district court, and utilizes both penal theory and elements of bureaucracy as a 
framework to examine how bureaucracy and rehabilitation co-exist within the same 
system.












Figure 3: Conceptual Framework and Question
FAMILY COURT 
Elements o f  both 
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• 2. Specialization -  specialized personnel justice’
3. Task Differentiation ~ cases specifically 2. Holism -  ‘one family, one judge’
docketed •
I low does family court operate?






There are two main objectives o f this study. The first objective is to conduct a 
process evaluation of a detention screening instrument. That evaluation has two 
components. One component will examine the systematic use of the instrument in all 
detention cases, and the second component will examine decision congruence, or how 
often the instrument recommendations are followed by judges. The detention screening 
instrument is then used as an independent variable in analyses relating to the second 
objective.
The second objective is to examine what factors predict court processing 
outcomes. Both objectives are theoretically tied to elements of penal theory and 
organizational theory. Hypotheses contrast a bureaucratic position with a rehabilitation 
orientation. This chapter begins with a discussion of the research design. The following 
sections address study population, state culture, measurement, data collection methods, 
hypotheses, and data analysis.
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Research Design
There are several models used in this research to examine predictions about 
bureaucracy and rehabilitation: a process evaluation model, ‘intermediary outcomes’ 
models, and a dispositional outcome model The research project involves an 
investigation of juvenile court records for a one-year period (August, 2000 - August, 
2001) in four counties in New Hampshire. Two counties (one family court system - 
Grafton County; one district court system -  Hillsborough County) employ the detention 
screening tool called the risk assessment instrument (RAI), and two counties do not (one 
family court system -  Rockingham County; one district court system -  Cheshire County). 
The two counties that utilize the instrument were chosen by the State. The two counties 
that do not use the RAI were selected by the researcher based on county demographic 
comparability.
For the process evaluation model the use of the RAI is the dependent variable. 
Systematic implementation of the instrument in the two pilot counties is explored 
primarily with regard to case factors and type o f court (family/district). The second 
process question is the degree to which there is decision congruence between the 
instrument recommendations and the judges’ decisions. The RAI was implemented six 
months into the study period. An analysis examining the counties before and after 
implementation was conducted. As noted in subsequent chapters, no significant 
differences before or after implementation were found. Because use of the RAI could 
influence further case processing, the RAI, as previously mentioned, was used as an 
independent variable in analyses relating to intermediary outcomes and dispositional
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outcome. Where appropriate, qualitative information gathered from discussions with 
judges, probation officers, attorneys, and police officers inform quantitative findings.
Study Population
The population of concern in this study is juvenile delinquent offenders in the 
State of New Hampshire who are detained. In this study, detainees are juveniles who are 
placed in secure, locked custody at any point during their court proceedings. Four 
counties compose the study population. For each of the four counties, all youth who were 
detained during the study time period were included in the study. Total study size is 174 
youth gathered from the sixteen courts located in these four counties. The sample can be 
termed a census of four counties because it involves an examination of all subjects during 
a time period who exhibit a certain characteristic -  detention.
Importantly, the study population is not random. Inferential statistics are based on 
the assumption o f random sampling methods to obtain probability samples. Probability 
samples are the “only type of sample that fully supports the use o f inferential statistical 
techniques to generalize to populations” (Healey, 1999, p. 140). Because the study 
counties are not necessarily predictive o f the full state, these results cannot be generalized 
to the rest o f the state. Because these cases are gathered cross-sectionally by tone period, 
however, it is possible to generalize, albeit cautiously, to other years in which the family 
court existed and to subsequent years given no significant change in these two court 
systems or in juvenile law. Therefore, while differences shown between these two court 
types are actual differences for the study year, it is possible to use inferential statistics to 
generalize to case processing outcomes in these courts during other years. Generalization 
to other jurisdictions outside the sate is also not possible. National statistics show that
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19% of all delinquency cases processed in 1998 were securely detained (Stahl, 2001). In 
contrast, only 9% o f all delinquency cases in these New Hampshire courts were detained 
during the study period. There certainly may be some real differences between what 
happens in these New Hampshire jurisdictions and what happens nationally.
Seven youth were removed from the study population. Four youth were arraigned 
in a study court, but subsequently transferred to courts outside the study area for 
adjudication and disposition. All four were transferred because they had open cases in 
these other jurisdictions. Cases were dismissed for the remaining three detained youth. 
Two o f these youth were found incompetent to stand trail and the third youth’s case was 
dismissed because the state foiled to prove its case. Excluded youth composed only 4% of 
the total study population. Characteristics of excluded youth were compared to the 
remaining study youth. No differences were found among the youth dropped from the 
analysis and the study youth.
In addition to cases removed, six youth were held in detention on an “interstate 
compact” during the data collection period. These youth were not included in the study. 
Interstate compacts are agreements between states to hold delinquent/runaway youths, 
picked up in one state but offenders from another state, in secure facilities until they are 
extradited back to the state in which they offended. Because these youth did not go 
through the court process in New Hampshire, they were not included in the study. 
Selection Bias Issues
As the flow chart in Chapter 1 shows, there are a number o f decision points in the 
juvenile justice process that affect future decisions. Filtration occurs throughout the court 
process (i.e. police prosecutors select which youths to petition) and there are multiple
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stages to the court process (Le. arraignment, adjudication, disposition). This study cannot 
account for which youths are petitioned to court, thereby creating a selection bias issue. 
Only a subsample of delinquents is available for inclusion. Nor can the study account for 
non-detained youth, further limiting the subsample for analysis. This study can, however, 
examine all the phases o f the court process for youth once they are detained. Other 
researchers note that failure to model each phase o f the process (Le. decision of who gets 
detained) may result in underestimation of certain effects (Bishop and Frazier, 1988; 
Myers and Talarico, 1986; see generally, Heckman, 1979). A two-stage modeling 
procedure is often applied to such data (see Berk, 1983). Because the selection process 
for who becomes detained is unknown, the process cannot be modeled.
An analysis of the present data shows that bifurcated hearings, or separate 
hearings for each phase of the court process, are atypical Almost two-thirds (62%) of all 
cases are disposed prior to the adjudication through what is called summary dispositions. 
For example, a youth that has an arraignment hearing during which s/he pleads true also 
can be sentenced during that same hearing. For processing occurring after detention, a 
two two-stage modeling procedure is inappropriate. Therefore, while the study cannot 
model court decision phases for non-detained youth, the procedure is not employed in 
this study o f detained youth because it would inaccurately model the court process in this 
state (also see Clarke and Koch, 1980). The feet that all detained youth in this study 
moved through all stages of the court process further demonstrates that the two-stage 
modeling procedure is unnecessary, since no filtration of cases occurred in the 
adjudication process.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
Youth who are detained are not representative of all youth who enter the juvenile 
justice system. Factors influencing detention in different areas tend to vary. Others have 
found, though not consistently, that the following variables influence detention: offense 
severity, number of prior offenses, race, positive/negative family relationships, and 
positive/negative school issues (See Bishop and Frazier, 1996; Boo kin-Weiner, 1984; 
Bortner and Reed, 1985; Clarke and Koch, 1980; Dannefer, 1984; Fenwick, 1982; Frazier 
and Cochran, 1986). In addition, though detention facilities contain chronic, severe, and 
violent offenders (Howell, 1995), less serious offenders are also included in the detention 
population, as evidenced by factors taken into account during the decision to detain. The 
study findings, then, may only be generalized to detainees from other years in the 
counties from which the population originated.
Data Collection and Procedures 
An analysis of court records was used to uncover factors associated with decision 
making through quantitative analysis. Court records include information on the present 
offense charges, court orders, assessments, and usually the police report and a pre- 
dispositional investigation conducted by the probation officer which includes a history of 
the child’s family, school, mental health, and other factors the probation officer deems 
relevant to the youth’s ultimate disposition. Under state law, school districts must 
participate in court action against educationally disabled youth.4 Court files on these 
youth also include some school records.
4 Educational disabilities include such things as emotionally handicapped (EH), attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADD/ADHD), learning disabled (LD), special education (SPED), and other 
health impaired (OHI).
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Because there is no statewide, integrated court computing system, at various 
intervals the researcher traveled to each court to gather the information from court 
records into an SPSS data file. All records of detained youth for the one year period were 
examined. Access to court records was granted through the State’s Administrative Office 
of the Courts (AOC). The AOC provides oversight and administration for all courts 
throughout the State. It was the AOC who sought out the particular instrument, decided 
upon pilot implementation, and requested an evaluation. The researcher wrote a proposal 
to support an evaluation of the instrument and requested access to further information to 
use as a dissertation study. Logistical issues, such as the collection of the data and the 
mode o f communication, were negotiated by the researcher with staff at each individual 
court.
Confidentiality was maintained throughout the project. Names of youth involved 
in the study were converted to a study number, thereby eliminating identification of 
individual youth. Confidentiality procedures were approved through the University of 
New Hampshire’s Internal Review Board (See Appendix A for approval letter), and 
through the State’s Administrative Office of the Courts.
The Culture of New Hampshire’s Juvenile Court
While this study examines differences between two court systems in New 
Hampshire, it is important for the reader who is familiar with other studies o f court 
processing to understand the general culture of New Hampshire’s juvenile court. Lemert 
(1970a) discussed the court as a loosely coupled system and found variations throughout 
the State of California. This may very well be true within states and from state-to-state. 
This section will discuss New Hampshire state differences in order to put the study in
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context and to understand the reasons why some variables were collected for study 
inclusion.
Attorneys
The basic right to counsel in juvenile court was afforded under In re Gault (1967). 
Since that time there has been much debate in the literature about the effects o f attorneys 
and the quality o f public and private attorneys (Feld, 1993; Burruss and Leonard, 2000). 
Whether or not a child has an attorney or the type of attorney (public/private) is not 
examined here. Under New Hampshire state statute (RSA 169:B 12), all youth who are 
detained or have the potential to be detained or committed to institutions are required to 
have representation. Since all youth in this study were detained, all youth have 
representation. Moreover, all but two youth had public defenders. New Hampshire may 
differ from other jurisdictions in this regard.
Although families o f a large portion of juveniles in this study (at least 40%) can 
afford private counsel according to state limits, they are allowed to retain a public 
defender and to subsequently reimburse the court (or more aptly, the county) for attorney 
expenses. Most families employ this option. Comments from two state juvenile justice 
professionals are illuminating.
As explained by one public defender, “You can’t find many private attorneys who 
are willing to do juvenile work. First, there’s no money or glory in it, and second, 
juvenile law is more complex than criminal law, so people just stay away from it.
Besides, the truth of the matter is that public defenders are the best representation that 
these kids are going to get.” (Public Defender J.C., personal communication, 11/12/01). 
Certainty a public defender may have a jaundiced view o f then: work as compared to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
private attorneys, but a probation officer shares this perception. “The public defenders as 
a group generally try to do what is in the best interests of the child, and most of them do a 
great job o f it. Sometimes, when you do get a private attorney in there [courtroom], it’s a 
nightmare. They have no idea about protocol and little knowledge o f juvenile law. It’s an 
entirely differently world than what they’re used to.” (Probation Officer D.S., personal 
communication, 10/12/01).
The present study does not include a predictor variable o f attorney representation 
like many other studies of case processing, because all potentially detainable youth in 
New Hampshire are represented, and almost all of these youth are represented by a public 
defender. In a sense, then, representation is a constant. All defendants are represented by 
the same agency, though there is likely to be some variation in the quality of 
representation within the agency.
Referral Agencies
Some studies have included the referral source in considering case outcomes for 
delinquents (Bailey and Peterson, 1981; Clarke and Koch, 1980; Garcia, 1998). Referrals 
to court can originate from police, schools, parents, and sometimes other community 
agents. In this study, all youth are referred by police agencies. Schools or parents initially 
may call the police for assistance. Once at the scene, however, the police take over and 
file the petition in court. Police, or prosecutors connected to a police department, decide 
whether cases go to court based on such things as the strength of the case and the type of 
offense. In most states, particularly larger ones, this is the task o f a court officer or 
probation officer, and it is termed an intake procedure. It is important to know that
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determining who comes to court in New Hampshire is a matter decided by police 
departments, not the courts.
Parents and Judges
Unlike some other states (Le. Pennsylvania, Oregon), in New Hampshire, a legal 
parent or guardian is required to attend all court hearings pertaining to the alleged 
delinquent child. While the degree of parent involvement varies by case, parents may 
have an effect on judicial decisions. As Bortner (1982) notes “...a major assumption 
inherent in the juvenile court process is that family structure not only contributes to the 
creation of delinquency, but that the structure can also be strengthened to minimize or 
eliminate delinquency” (p. 20S). Family variables that assess family structure as well as 
family relationships are included in the study.
In New Hampshire, attorneys interested in serving as a member of the judiciary 
must first submit an application to the State for consideration. Judges are appointed to the 
bench by the Governor’s Executive Council. Once appointed, judges can serve for life. 
Juvenile court judges in New Hampshire probably have more discretion than then: 
counterparts in larger states when it comes to detention. These judges ultimately 
determine who gets detained, unlike judges in larger states. If police officers or probation 
officers want to detain youth, they must obtain a valid court order, which can only be 
issued by a judge. Judges are on call around the state 24 hours a day to determine whether 
or not youth should be detained. This function in larger states is usually relegated to 
probation officers or court intake officers.
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Resource Availability
New Hampshire is what the National Center for Juvenile Justice terms a 
“centralized system”, where administration of services to pre-delinquents and delinquents 
is organized at the state level (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2002). This means 
that facilities such as detention centers and treatment institutions are run or contracted by 
the State. In addition, services are options available to all courts through the State. The 
result of statewide organization is that all courts vie for the same resources. In contrast, 
some other states organize their services at the county level. In those states, commitment 
to facilities is often a function of differential availability of services in each county. 
Methodological implications for a centralized system are that, while there is no control 
for resource availability in the study, there is no bias by county because all courts 
compete for the same available services.
Measurement
The unit of analysis for the research is the individual juvenile case. It is possible 
that some individuals may have more than one case; for instance, if a juvenile is in the 
system more than once over the course of the study period. In such instances, only the 
first case during the study time period is included. An advantage o f examining ‘hard 
copy9 data files as opposed to computer files is the availability of more information, 
particularly qualitative information that can be garnered from reports. This method 
provided a rich source o f individual level data, including some measures (i.e. educational 
disability and mental health/substance abuse diagnosis) that have rarely been used in this 
type of research (Fader et a l, 2001), but have case as relating to differential court 
outcomes (Applegate, Turner, Sanborn, Latessa, and Moon, 2000).
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All variables in the analysis are individual level based on the case, except for two 
aggregate factors. Court type, the main variable of interest and geographic location are 
measured at a higher unit of analysis. Different levels of measurement could result in 
problems with analyses. Potential problems include collinearity between individual level 
factors and aggregates and heteroscedasticity as large numbers of individual cases are 
nested within smaller numbers of aggregates (Byrk and Raudenbush, 1992). A correlation 
matrix (shown and discussed in the following chapter) and diagnostic graphs for 
measurement variables show that neither problem is an issue in this study. Given that, it 
should be noted that hierarchical linear and logistic modeling specifically addresses this 
type of multi<level data (Byrk and Raudenbush, 1992). This technique models individual 
factors, aggregate factors, and their influence together. Unfortunately, small study size 
limits the use of that technique here.
Independent Variables
Independent variables used in this study are operationalized below. As mentioned, 
court type is the main variable of interest and the other aggregate variable is geographic 
location. Individual variables are grouped according to the characteristics o f legal factors, 
or factors related to the case, and extra-legal factors, or social characteristics.
Court Type is coded as a diehotomous variable 0 = district court and 1 = family 
court. Geographic Location is coded as a dkhotomous variable 0 = urban and 1 = rural 
based on 1993 US Department of Agriculture Beale Coding for US counties.
Legal factors. Offense Severity is the New Hampshire state severity coding of 
offenses; range from Level I (minor offenses) to Level IV (major offenses). Appendix B 
includes a full description of levels and offenses. Prior Offenses, the number of prior
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
court cases, was coded as 0,1,2,3 or more. Because there were very few youth who had 
more than three prior court cases, these cases were combined into a “three or more” 
category. Multiple Charges was coded as a diehotomous variable 0 = no and 1 = yes, 
indicating whether or not there is more than one offense charge for current court case. 
Weapon was coded as a diehotomous variable 0 = no and 1 = yes, indicating whether a 
weapon was used in present offense. Weapons can include many things such as firearms, 
knives, and blunt instruments (Le. lead pipes). RAI is coded as 0 = no and 1 = yes for the 
use of the instrument in the court processing models. As previously mentioned, the RAI 
is a dependent variable for the evaluation model
Extra-Legal Characteristics. Gender is coded as 0 = male and 1 = female.
Ethnicity is coded as 0 = white and 1 = non-white. The original database had separate 
coding for black, Hispanic, Asian, and other. Because there were so few minorities (n = 
30), these categories were collapsed for analysis. Socio-Economic Status was coded as 0 
= poverty-public assistance and 1 = non-poverty-non-public assistance. Information on 
socio-economic status (SES) was obtained by an examination of financial information in 
court files. Parents or legal guardians are required to fill out a financial affidavit m order 
to obtain a publicdefender. Household income was taken from this affidavit to determine 
SES. Households under the current poverty level standards for New Hampshire published 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services were coded as “poverty-public 
assistance”. Age of youth was coded as 13 and under, 14,15, and 16. Younger ages were 
combined because there were only five youth under age 13 in the sample. Cell size 
became too small for multivariate analyses. To correct for this problem, categories of 
cases were combined which resulted in a more stable model with variation across x and y
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combinations. Family Structure was coded as 0 = two parent, 1 = single parent, 3 = other. 
Two parent families included blended families, while the other category included 
juveniles living with other relatives and those in state care, such as those in foster/group 
homes. Mental Health/Substance Abuse Diagnosis is coded as a dichotomous.variable 0 
= no and 1 = yes, indicating whether a youth has a mental health diagnosis, a substance 
abuse diagnosis, or both. Educational Disability is coded as a diehotomous variable 0 = 
no and 1 = yes. Family Issues is coded as a diehotomous variable of 0 = no and 1 = yes, 
indicating whether youth has noted negative family relations in the court case file. School 
Issues is coded as a diehotomous variable 0 = no and 1 = yes, indicating whether youth 
has noted negative school relations in the court case file.
Dependent Variables
There are several different dependent variables in this analysis. The first 
dependent variable for the process evaluation question is systematic use of the RAI, coded 
dichotomousiy as 0 = no and 1 = yes. This refers to whether the RAI was used in each 
detention case. The second process evaluation dependent variable is the decision 
congruence of the RAI coded dichotomousiy as 0 = no and 1 = yes. Decision congruence 
refers to whether or not actions taken by the judge to detain/not to detain match what the 
instrument predicts should happen. For the larger questions o f how cases are processed in 
the two different court systems, there are several dependent variables broken down into 
intermediary outcomes and dispositional outcome.
Intermediary Outcomes. Intermediary outcomes include the following dependent 
variables. Case Processing Time is a base 10 logarithmic transformation of the number of 
days cases take to be processed from petition to disposition. This variable was
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transformed because univariate analysis showed that the distribution of the variable was 
not normal, displaying a severely positive skew. A graph of case processing time in its 
original form is shown in Appendix C. While transformation of any variable, and 
particularly a dependent variable, makes interpretation more complicated, it changes the 
distributional shape to allow mean-based statistics to more accurately describe the data 
and to be more efficient and unbiased in estimation (Hamilton, 1992). Length o f Stay at 
the detention facility is another intermediary outcome that suffers from the same problem 
as case processing time: specifically, severe positive skew. Appendix C also shows the 
line graph of length of detention stay. This variable was also transformed into its base 10 
log.5 Plea Bargains was coded dichotomousiy as 0 = no and 1 = yes, indicating whether a 
case was resolved through a plea bargain. Finally, Court-Ordered Evaluations was coded 
dichotomousiy as 0 = no and 1 = yes, indicating whether the case included any court- 
ordered evaluations or assessments o f the youth and/or his family.
Dispositional Outcome. Dispositional Outcome was coded dichotomousiy as 0 = 
released and 1 = committed. Released refers to a dispositional placement in the 
community on probation. In 3% o f cases (n=6) it also refers to cases placed “on file 
without a finding” for a period of time. In these cases, judges dismissed charges, 
provided that offenders had no new court cases within a certain period o f time (i.e. 6 
months). In essence, these youth were released to the community with a stipulation that 
they remain “petition free”. Committed, on the other hand, refers to a dispositional
5 There are several points at which youth seem to leave detention - after seven days and after 28 days. An 
attempt to recode the variable into quartiles (25* percentile = 7 days, 50* percentile = 16 days, 75 
percentile = 23 days) not only resulted in a loss of efficiency, but also did not seem to accurately model the 
process.
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commitment to residential facilities or the training school Residential facilities are 
committal placements to institutions that deal with behavioral problems. Some residential 
facilities also specialize in other defined problems, such as substance abuse, teen 
pregnancy, and sexual offending. As noted in Chapter One, the training school is the 
juvenile equivalent to adult prison.
Categories for dispositional outcome were grouped from an original coding of 
dispositional outcome as an ordinal variable because small study size prohibited a more 
detailed disaggregation of the dependent variable. The following ordinal classification, 
however, will be examined at the bivariate level with type of court. The breakdown of 
categories is as follows: The State’s only training school the Youth Development Center 
(YDC), is the most severe disposition for youth. However, there are some significant 
qualitative differences between probation, and YDC placement until the youth turns 18 
years old. Youth can be sent to what is considered to be “staff secure” placements, or 
residential facilities, such as wilderness programs and substance abuse treatment facilities 
as discussed above. Dispositional release also can be distinguished by time. Ordinal 
categories of dispositional outcome will be examined on a severity continuum (probation 
for 6 months and under, probation between 6 months and one year, probation over one 
year, residential facility, YDC).
Instrumentation
One instrument, the RAI, is used in this study. A copy of the Risk Assessment 
Screening Instrument, as it is officially called, is included in Appendix D. This 
instrument has been piloted in Florida, California, Oregon, Illinois, and New York. In 
those locations, the instrument was adapted as a consensus-based tool The statistical
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reliability and validity may be questionable. Because the RAI has been modified by New 
Hampshire stakeholders, close scrutiny of the instrument is necessary. This analysis, 
however, addresses only a process evaluation of that instrument. In other words, the 
present study examines if the instrument is being utilized properly by juvenile justice 
professionals. The predictive efficacy of the instrument is another matter. This study 
makes no claims to address that issue, which should be a topic of future research.
Hypotheses
A tension exists between the bureaucratic ideals of uniformity and efficiency and 
the rehabilitative ideal of a holistic approach. The hypotheses stated below are organized 
to examine those tensions. The goal here is to examine whether family court is best 
characterized by a bureaucratic or a rehabilitative dynamic. Hypotheses relate to the 
tenets of these theories as enumerated in Figure 2.
Fvaluation Hypotheses
The evaluation of the detention screening tool involves two research questions 
dealing with uniformity and decision congruence. Bureaucratic predictions about 
consistency and the acceptance of mandates would lead to one set of predictions, while 
the rehabilitative ideal of treating offenders as individuals would lead to a separate set of 
predictions.
1. The RAI is more uniformly applied in family court cases than in district court cases 
(bureaucratic prediction).
The RAI is less uniformly applied in family court cases than in district court cases 
(rehabilitative prediction).
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2. There is more decision congruence with the RAI in family court cases than in district 
court cases (bureaucratic prediction).
There is less decision congruence with the RAI in family court cases than in district court 
cases (rehabilitative prediction).
Decision Making Hypotheses
Because the RAI assists in the decision making process, it is used as an 
independent variable in this model The issue of discriminatory or differential decision 
making will be examined. Although family courts are more bureaucratically organized, 
they are premised on the idea of rehabilitation -  judges can make better decisions if they 
know more about youths’ situations and families. The hypotheses pertaining to decision 
making are as follows.
Intermediary Outcome Hypotheses. These hypotheses refer to system outcomes 
prior to case disposition. In these situations, case handling can be thought of as a series of 
“intermediary outcomes”. Bureaucracy leads to predictions o f efficiency m handling 
court cases and consistency across categories of offenders. Detention times and case 
processing times should be shorter in more bureaucratic courts. There should be more 
plea bargains and fewer court-ordered assessments, both of which decrease case delay 
times. In addition, fewer clinical assessments can be predicted to increase consistency in 
handling offenders. Rehabilitation ideals predict the opposite in these situations.
3. Cases are processed more quickly in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(bureaucratic prediction).
Cases are processed more slowly in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(rehabilitative prediction).
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4. Periods o f detention are shorter in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(bureaucratic prediction).
Periods o f detention are longer in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(rehabilitative prediction).
5. There are fewer evaluations and assessments on cases in family court as opposed to 
district court (bureaucratic prediction).
There are more evaluations/assessments on cases in family court as opposed to district 
court (rehabilitative prediction).
6. There are more plea bargains in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(bureaucratic prediction).
There are fewer plea bargains in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(rehabilitative prediction).
Dispositional Outcome Hypothesis. This refers to overall system output, which is 
sentencing. Given the bureaucratic and rehabilitative framework, each perspective would 
predict differences between family court and district court in the disposition of cases.
Prior research has shown that more bureaucratic courts dispense more severe dispositions 
than less bureaucratic courts while more rehabilitative courts may release more youth 
back into their communities.
7. Cases will be sentenced more severely in family court than in district court 
(bureaucratic prediction).
Cases will be sentenced less severely in family court than in district court (rehabilitative 
prediction).
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Data Analysis
Bivariate relationships were examined for strong and significant relationships. 
Descriptive analysis is presented in the next chapter. Potential problems, such as 
multicollinearity are addressed. Multivariate analysis utilizes regression techniques, 
including logit for diehotomous dependent variables and ordinary least squares regression 
for the two transformed continuous dependent variables. Because this is a year census, 
any effects, significant or not are real Significance, however, assists in generalizability.
In all multivariate models, court type was entered as a first variable. In a second step, all 
other variables were entered and backward selection was used to uncover any significant 
relationships. This particular method was used because theory and prior research do not 
provide any clear indications of what variables should be included in multivariate 
models. Further, the small study size limited the number of variables that could be 
entered into the model at one time. Backward selection, therefore, was used with a 
conventional .05 alpha level as a cut point for entry into the model. The following two 
chapters present the results of the analyses. Full regression equations for backward 
selection models are located in Appendix E.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY DESCRIPTIVES AND RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT RESULTS
Descriptive Analyses
Study Population Descriptives
Table 1 contains descriptive characteristics about the juveniles m the study. Most 
detainees were white males with an average age of 14.6 years.6 Detainees are more likely 
than not to have a mental health and/or substance abuse diagnosis and to have an 
educational disability coding in school A majority of detainees live in single-parent 
homes and their families qualify for public assistance. The offenses resulting in detention 
tend to be misdemeanors against the person (62%), or Level II offenses under state 
guidelines. Importantly, 56% of those misdemeanor against the person offenses stem 
from violence within the family (Le. assault or threat against a parent or sibling). Very 
few offenses (23%) resulting in detention were the result o f felony crimes. Sixty-one 
percent of youth were on some sort o f court ordered conditional release or placement 
when the offense for which they were detained occurred. Finally, approximately one-half 
o f the offenders went through district court, while the other half went through family 
court. Slightly over three-quarters o f youth came from urban counties (Hillsborough 
and Rockingham). In sum, detainees tend to be white males from single-parent homes 
with lower SES. They also tend to have mental health and/or substance abuse problems
6 The age of majority for criminal offenses in New Hampshire is 17 years old.
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and to have a difficult time in school. These offenders are not new to the system and 
usually have committed misdemeanor crimes that resulted m detention.
While New Hampshire does not keep statewide statistics on delinquent youth, 
generic comparisons suggest that there may in fact be some discrepancies in who gets 
detained. For instance, the study counties are 97% white overall, yet the detention study 
population shows non-whites constitute 18% of those detained. New Hampshire has one 
of the lowest rates of children living in poverty in the state (Annie E. Casey Foundation, 
2002), yet the detention study population shows that 60% of youth in detention are at or 
below the poverty line. A recent national survey showed educationally disabled youth 
comprised 45% of the detained and/or committed population (Quinn, 2001), yet they 
compose 63% of the population in the New Hampshire detention facility. Finally, with 
regard to gender, national court statistics show that detention populations consist o f 
approximately 16% female (Poe-Yamagata and Butts, 1996). The New Hampshire 
detention population, however, is 29% female.
Controlling for offense severity and prior offenses may paint a slightly different 
picture. For example, national arrest statistics show that non-whites are responsible for a 
disproportionate amount of the serious crime (Snyder and Sickmund, 1999). These data 
suggest that there may be some discrepancies between youth who are detained and those 
who are not. Those disparities, however, should not be thought o f as synonymous with 
discrimination (See Myers and Talarico, 1986) and further investigation o f the causes of 
disproportional confinement must be investigated.
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Table 1: Study Descriptives (N = 174)
Gender 71% Male
Ethnicity 83% White
SES 62% Public Assistance/Poverty Level
Age 31% age 16
28% age IS
26% age 14
15% ages 13 and under
Mean Age = 14.6 Years
Family Structure 58% Single-Parent Homes 
35% Two-Parent Homes 
7% Other Household Arrangement
Mental Heahh/Substance Abuse Diagnosis 56% Diagnosed
Educational Disability 63% Coded
Offense Severity 62% Misdemeanor Against Person 
15% Misdemeanor Against Property 
12% Felony Against Person 
11% Felony Against Property
Current System Involvement 61% Involved with JJS
Court Type 51% District Courts / 49% Family Courts
County Type 78% Urban County
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Bivariate Relationships
A bivariate Pearson correlation matrix of all variables is shown in Table 2. The 
method of data collection provided a rich source of information from case files. Because 
the literature is unclear about which variables are important in case processing, and 
because this study examines some case processing outcomes that have rarefy been 
considered, many variables were initially examined.
Court type is moderately correlated to three of the four intermediary outcome 
variables. Cases from family court are significantly more likely to have longer days in 
detention (r = .24, p <.01), and less likely to be plea bargained (r = -.22., p <.01). Cases 
from family court are also more likely to include court ordered evaluations and 
assessments (r = .22, p < .01). These bivariate associations are all in the direction 
predicted by rehabilitation hypotheses.
There are other significant correlations between cases from these two court 
systems. Cases from family court include less serious offenders (r = -.15, p<.05), fewer 
females (r = -.18, p<.05), fewer non-whites (r = -.17, p<.05), higher familial SES (r = .16, 
p<.05), more mental health/substance abuse diagnoses (r = .IS, p<.01), and more school 
issues (r = . 17, p<.05). Differences with regard to case seriousness, ethnicity, and SES 
may well be due to the influence of the two largest cities in New Hampshire, Manchester 
and Nashua, both of which are located in district court jurisdictions. More urban areas are 
more diverse with regard to ethnicity and SES, and handle more serious offenses. Other 
significant correlations between independent and dependent variables are discussed 
below.
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RAI. The correlations related to the RAI are only examined for the subset of the 
study population (two counties) that piloted the RAI and only refer to whether or not the 
RAI is used. The RAI is used more often in cases with offenders with two parent families 
(r = -.30, p<.05). Cases that use the RAI are also plea bargained (r = .34, p<.05) and 
involve a longer detention stay (r = .36, p<.05). These findings may reflect random 
variation, and as discussed in future analysis, have no significant influence in multivariate 
analysis of hypotheses.
Case Processing Time. There are no significant correlations between any o f the 
independent variables and the log o f case processing time. Another dependent variable, 
length o f detention stay is correlated with the case processing time (r = . 19, p<.05). 
Univariate analysis of the untransfermed variable shows a considerable amount of 
variation in case processing time, ranging from 5 days to 479 days. Although univariate 
analysis shows that family courts took longer to process cases (family court mean -  58 
days, median = 61 days, district court mean -  49 days, median = 53 days), these 
differences are not significant either in their original form or in their functional form. It 
may be that the independent variables in this analysis are not significantly related to case 
processing time because other factors, such as the availability of social services, may 
control how long cases take to be processed.
Detention Stay. Similar to case processing time, there is a lot of variation in 
length of detention stay (range = 1-136 days) at the univariate, untransformed level As 
noted, because of this variation, the variable was transformed using a base 10 logarithm. 
Although transformations assist in modeling a linear relationship, it does provide 
difficulty in interpretation, especially at the bivariate level As discussed, court type is
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correlated with this variable. In addition, educational disability is correlated with the days 
detained (r = .23, p<.01). Cases with youth who have educational disabilities and cases 
coining from family court also have longer periods of detention.
Plea Bargains. As mentioned, court type is significantly correlated with plea 
bargains. Other significant correlations with plea bargains include the following: offense 
severity (r = .24, p<.01); number of prior offenses (r = -.22, p<.01); multiple charges (r = 
.33, p<.01); mental health/substance abuse diagnosis (r = -.22, p<.01). More severe 
offenses and multiple charges are correlated with plea bargains. On the other hand, those 
cases in which youth have mental health/substance abuse diagnoses as well as cases with 
more prior offenses are negatively correlated with plea bargains. Although little empirical 
work has been done in this area, it seems logical that more serious offenses and cases 
with multiple charges would be plea bargained, while cases with more prior offenses are 
less likely to be plea bargained.
Assessments. The strongest correlation in the analysis occurs between 
assessments and mental health/substance abuse diagnosis (r = .53, p<.01). Cases that 
include youth who have a mental health or substance abuse diagnosis are also more likely 
to contain a court ordered assessment. Again, court type is also significantly correlated 
with assessments, as are prior offenses (r = . 17, p<.05); age (r = -. 18, p<.05); educational 
disability (r = .21, p<.01); and school issues (r = .35, p<.01). There are more court 
ordered assessments with cases in which there are more prior offenses, older youth, youth 
with educational disabilities, and youth with negative school issues.
Dispositional Outcome. Table 2 shows that contrary to a bureaucratic or a 
rehabilitative prediction, court type is not significantly correlated with dispositional
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outcome (r = .07). Number of priors shows a moderate association with the dependent 
variable (r = .45, p<.01). The more prior offenses, the more likely the dispositional 
commitment. Multiple charges show a weak negative correlation with dispositional 
outcome (r = -.16, p<.05). Cases that involve multiple charges are released upon 
disposition. On the other hand, cases that involve youth with mental health/substance 
abuse diagnoses are likely to be committed (r = .27, p<.01) as are cases in which 
offenders have an educational disability (r = .15, p<.05). Negative school issues also are 
related to dispositional commitment (r — .18, p<.05). Two dependent variables show a 
weak correlation with dispositional outcome. These are the log of days detained (r = .24, 
p<.05) and assessments (r = .18, p<.05). Longer logs of detention stays are correlated 
with dispositional commitment. Cases that include court ordered assessments are 
associated with commitment. Conversely, the intermediate outcome of plea bargains 
shows a weak, negative correlation with sentencing outcome (r = -.22, p<.05). As 
expected, cases that are plea bargained are released on community disposition.
There do not appear to be any problems o f muhicollinearity in this data. 
Muhicollinearity involves situations where independent variables are highly correlated 
with each other, each variable not contributing independently to explaining variations in 
the dependent variable. Correlation matrices provide an initial indication of problems. A 
more definitive test is a regression of each variable on the other. Higher R2 are indicative 
of muhicollinearity issues (Hamilton, 1992). Given the relatively weak correlations found 
in the data, only offense severity and weapon involvement (r = .37) were further 
examined for muhicollinearity issues. Regression results (not shown) do not reveal any 
problems. Both variables, then, remain in the analysis.
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In sum, bivariate analysis shows that court type is significantly correlated to the 
dependent variables of length of detention stay, assessments, plea bargains, but not to 
case processing time. Two o f these relationships are in the direction predicted by 
rehabilitative hypotheses (assessments and plea bargains) and one is in the direction 
predicted by bureaucratic ideals (length of detention stay).












Table 2: Pearson Correlation of all Variables
1 2 3 I 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14
1 Case l ime 1.00
2 Detain Time .19* 1.00
3 Assessment .15 .09 1.00
4 Plea Bargain -.09 -.01 -.13 1.00
S Disposition .13 .24** .18* -.22* 1.00
6 Offense -.01 .04 -.04 .24** .05 1.00
7 Prior Ofl'ense .06 .10 .17* -.22** .45** -.12 1.00
8 Multiple -.03 -.05 .11 .33** -.16* .23** .26** 1.00
9 Weapon -.03 -.04 -.07 .08 .07 .37** .02 -.00 1.00
I0RAI* -.08 .36* -.25 .34* .02 -.11 .17 .09 .14 1.00
11 Gender -.05 -.07 .04 -.03 .01 -.07 -.08 -.04 -.01 .10 1.00
12 Ethnicity -.01 -.02 -.07 .09 -.05 .08 .15 -.08 .12 -.11 -.03 1.00
13 SES .09 .00 -.01 .04 -.04 -.13 -.09 .06 -.12 .03 -.00 -.08 1.00 *
14 Age -.04 .00 -.18* .01 .08 -.03 .13 -.18* -.15* .09 .00 .03 .16* 1.00
IS Family Struct. .04 .01 -.10 .07 -.06 .04 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.30* .02 .16* -.32* .02
16 MH/SA Dx .14 .12 .53** -.22** .27** -.10 .22** .04 -.13 -.07 .07 -.15 .02 .05
17 Coded .05 .23** .21** -.06 .15* -.03 -.01 .11 -.08 .05 -.16 -.18* .02 .01
18 Family Issues -.02 i © u> -.10 -.06 .05 -.16* -.07 .01 -.06 .27 .23** -.19* .07 -.06
19 School Issues .12 .07 .35** -.09 .18* -.11 .20** .07 -.08 .00 -.12 -.12 .06 -.10
20 Geography .05 .09 .03 .06 .04 .02 .06 -.01 -.06 .20 -.04 .07 .09 .18*
21 Court Type .13 .24** .22** -.22** .07 -.15* -.03 -.04 .04 -.11 -.18* -.17* .16* .10
Two-tailed significance * p<.05, ** p<.01













Tuble 2: Person Correlation of all Variables (cont.)
15 16 17 18 19
15 Family Struct. 1.00
16 MH/SA Dx -.14
17 Coded .02
18F ”, Issues .03
19 School Issues -.15
20 Geography .14




.26** .29** .13 1.00
-.01 -.03 -.02 .00
.15** .07 .00 .17*







Risk Assessment Instrument Results 
Recall from the previous chapter that two counties in the study are piloting the 
RAI. One county is a family court system (Grafton) and the other is a district court 
system (Hillsborough). Again, this research is concerned with the actual use of the 
instrument in detention cases and the decision congruence of the instrument as they relate 
to court type. As discussed, the RAI was implemented six months into the study period, 
so study size for these analyses is smaller than analyses in the next chapter. This section 
will first examine the actual use of the RAI and will subsequently examine the decision 
congruence of the RAI for the six months during the study period that the instrument was 
implemented. A discussion of results will follow. Because of the small number of cases 
involved, this section will emphasize bivariate results.
Use of Instrument
A key question for the process evaluation is whether or not the instrument was 
used in detention cases. Briefly, the bureaucratic rationale suggests that the RAI is more 
likely to be used in family courts because mandates, such as one to utilize forms, will be 
more easily absorbed and because the RAI, a simple scoring instrument, will be seen as 
resulting in efficient and consistent processing of offenders as well as a calculable and 
predictable method to deal with offender risk. In contrast, the rehabilitation approach 
would predict resistance by the family court to imposed standardization of cases. Under 
the rehabilitation rationale, each offender must be treated individually.
1. The RAI is more uniformly applied in family court cases than in district court cases 
(bureaucratic prediction).
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The RAI is less uniformly applied in family court cases than in district court cases 
(rehabilitation prediction).
The RAI in general is more likely to be used with more serious offenses as shown 
in Figure 3, where bars reflect the use of the RAI for each offense severity level in each 
type o f court. District courts are also more likely to use the instrument.
Figure 3: RAI use by Offense Severity and Court Type
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Offense Severity
Meanwhile, Table 3 shows these results numerically. While there is a numeric difference 
in whether or not the instrument was utilized when detention decisions were made, this 
difference is not statistically significant. It bears mentioning that because there are very 
few cases in general (n=46), significance tests may not be a good measure of the 
relationship between these two variables as they are very sensitive to study size (Healey, 
1999). Relationships that are substantively important may not show up as statistically 
significant when study size is small Further, given that this is a census and not a sample, 
any differences uncovered are real differences between the courts. Thus, family courts are 
less likely to use the instrument in general, giving support to a rehabilitative prediction
100
I □District Court; 
!■ Family Court ■
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
Table 3: Uniformity in Use o f RAI by Court Type
Was RAI Filled Out 
No
Yes
District Court (n=36) 
19.4%
80.6%
Family Court (n=!0) 
30.0%
70.0%
Fisher’s Exact Test = .67
Decision Congruence in Use of Instrument
The process evaluation also takes into account whether or not there was decision 
congruence between the instrument and the judicial decision when the instrument was 
utilized in detention cases. On the RAI form, there is room forjudges to override the 
instrument where they feel it is warranted in individual cases. Decision congruence takes 
into account overrides as well as inaccuracy in scoring the instrument. While these two 
issues (overrides and scoring) may result from different processes (i.e. overrides as a 
conscious decision and inaccurate scoring as an inadvertent mistake), it appears that some 
‘mistakes’ in scoring may actually be intentional. As one supervisory police officer put it, 
“Officers look at it as perfunctory, and don’t know its purpose. They just want the bottom 
line [overall score] to equate to detention.” (Police Officer S.L., personal communication, 
10/2/01). Thus, both overrides and scoring are incorporated into this dependent variable. 
Hypotheses and their logic are stated below.
Similar to the previous hypothesis, the bureaucratic rationale suggests that official 
mandates will be more easily absorbed into bureaucratic entities, and because of the 
bureaucratic emphasis on consistency and efficiency, there will be more decision 
congruence. On the other hand, a rehabilitative approach suggests that overrides and 
scoring issues will be more prevalent in family court because o f the emphasis on 
individual treatment.
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2. There is more decision congruence between the RAI and judges' decisions in family 
court cases than in district court cases (bureaucratic prediction).
There is less decision congruence between the RAI and judges' decisions in family court 
cases than in district court cases (rehabilitation prediction).
Figure 4 shows the percent of cases in which the RAI was overridden in each type 
of court at each offense severity level District courts are more likely to override less 
serious cases, while family courts are more likely to override the RAI with more serious 
cases. At state offense severity level 3, neither court overrode the RAI. Figure 4 
demonstrates that that family courts are, in general more likely to override the RAI. 
Figure 4: RAI Decision Congruence by Offense Severity and Court Type
□  District Court 
■  Family C out
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Offense Severity
Meanwhile, Table 4 shows that there was less decision congruence in family courts as 
opposed to district courts. Similar to the previous analysis, this relationship is not 
statistically significant. Again this analysis suffers from the same pitfalls of small study 
size. This analysis lends support to a rehabilitative model for family court. When the RAI 
is used, family courts are less likely to use it consistent with instrument 
recommendations.
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Fisher’s Exact Test = .20
*Note: There are fewer cases in this analysis as only those cases in which a form was 
used are available for analysis.
Multivariate Analyses
Multivariate analyses with such few cases is risky because without enough cases 
in each combination of x and y values, the model becomes unstable (Long, 1997). One 
way to examine instability is to examine the combination of x and y values, coefficients, 
and standard errors of the coefficients in the output. Thin cells and high standard errors 
are indicative of model instability and the inappropriateness of multivariate techniques. 
These diagnostic methods were used for each o f the evaluation questions. Analysis 
revealed that only the model involving the question about form use appears to be stable 
controlling for only the variables considered on the RAI (offense seventy and prior 
offenses). Because of small study size, backward selection o f all independent variables 
was attempted, but it foiled to converge. Due to the small number of cases, extreme 
caution should be used when these results are interpreted.
Table 5 includes court type as well as offense severity and number of priors, the 
two factors taken into account on the RAI form. The logistic model is not significant (£*= 
4.89, p=.18) and explains ten percent o f the variance in form use (pseudo R2=. 10). Court 
type foils to be a strong predictor o f form use (OR = .68), while offense severity and prior 
offenses are more strongly related to form use. Forms are two times more likely to be 
utilized in cases that have more serious offenses, holding constant prior offenses and
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court type. Conversely, forms are two times less likely to be used in cases with more 
prior offenses, all things being equal In sum, both offense severity and number of priors 
are more important factors than court type in determining use of the RAI, though family 
courts are less likely to use the form holding constant the factors taken into account on 
the RAI.
Table 5: Multivariate Analysis of Uniformity in Use*
Odds Ratio Significance
Court Type .68 (1.02) .71
Offense Severity 2.14 (.52) .14
Prior Offenses .50 (.43) .10
Likelihood Chi-Square 4.89
Pseudo R2 .10
* Standard errors in parentheses.
Summary
Bivariate analysis shows that family courts use the RAI less often, though that 
difference is not large. When family courts do use the RAI, they override it more often 
than district courts. Because of the problem of small study size, multivariate analysis 
could be conducted only on one set o f hypotheses. Logistic analysis o f uniformity in form 
use shows that the factors taken into account on the form, offense severity and number of 
prior offenses, are more important, all other things being equal than court type. All 
analyses, however, were not significant. Since the study is a census o f a one-year period 
and not a sample, the findings indicate that family courts are acting in ways predicted by 
a rehabilitative approach. These may be chance fluctuations, however, and not 
attributable to years.




This chapter discusses the intermediary outcomes and the dispositional outcome 
of cases processed in two court systems. A summary table o f regression results o f how 
court type affects these dependent variables is discussed first. Subsequently, each set of 
hypotheses is repeated before the corresponding analysis. Intermediary outcomes are 
discussed before dispositional outcome. The chapter concludes with a discussion of these 
results.
Summary Analysis
Bivariate regression was used to examine the main effects of court type on 
different outcomes.7 Table 6 displays results from the OLS regression with transformed 
dependent variables, while Table 7 shows the results from the logistic regression for 
dichotomous dependent variables. Results are examined in relation to bureaucratic and 
rehabilitation predictions. Results should not be compared across categories because they 
involve different equations with different dependent variables and variation in error terms 
in each model. The tables are meant to provide a synopsis of how court type, without any 
other independent variables, affects each dependent variable.
7 Because the RAI was implemented six months into the study period, an analysis with just the RAI 
counties was run. There were no strong relationships found, nor significant findings.
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The effects of court type on the log o f case processing time and the log of 
detention stay are not directly interpretable. Therefore Table 6 contains antilog 
transformations to the natural units (days) of these variables. Family courts take longer to 
process offenders than district courts (predicted average of 37 days vs. 35 days), though 
that difference is not statistically significant (p=.l 1) at the conventional .05 alpha level.
On the other hand, court type is significantly related to the number o f days detained 
(p=.00). Family courts hold youth in detention for longer periods of time. On average, 
family courts hold youth in detention for 13 days compared to 10 days for youth from 
district court. These results support rehabilitative predictions. Taking a holistic approach 
to offenders translates into longer case processing time and detention stays.
Table 6: Main Effects of Outcome by Court Type
Outcome Predicted Probabilities (days) Significance
Case Processing Time Family Court = 37 .11
District Court = 35
Detention Stay Family Court = 13 .00
District Court = 10
Table 7 shows that court type is significantly related to plea bargains and 
assessments. Cases from family court are only 40% as likely to be plea bargained 
compared to cases from district court. Cases from family court also are two tunes more 
likely to contain assessments than district court. Both of these results lend support to a 
rehabilitative orientation. In contrast, family court is slightly (34%) more likely to 
commit youth at sentencing, but that result is not statistically significant.
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* Standard errors are in parentheses. 
± Family court is coded as 1.
Intermediary Outcomes
Recall that intermediary outcomes include case processing time, length of 
detention stay, whether or not there were plea bargains, and whether or not there were 
case assessments.
Case Processing Time
The logic of case processing time is as follows: A hallmark of bureaucracy is 
efficiency. As such cases should be processed more quickly. Alternatively, a 
rehabilitative orientation calls for individual investigation of each case and the needs of 
each offender. Therefore, the rehabilitative ideal would predict that cases are processed 
more slowly.
3. Cases are processed more quickly in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(bureaucratic prediction).
Cases are processed more slowly in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(rehabilitation prediction).
A backward selection OLS model was run with court type entered first and all 
other variables in a second step. As with the bivariate model in Table 6, court type is not 
significantly related to the log of case processing time, though it does have some effect 
size (standardized beta -  .09). No other variables in this study were significantly related
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to case processing time at the multivariate level. Other variables not included in the study 
must account for the remainder of the variation in case processing time.
One factor involved in case processing time, resource availability, may play a 
large role in how long cases take to be processed through the system. Cases that involve a 
dispositional commitment to residential facilities or to YDC are subject to service, or 
“bed space”, availability (See, for example, Butts and Adams, 2001; Steinhert, no date).
In New Hampshire, as in other states, cases can be continued until a space becomes 
available. Since both district courts and family courts compete for the same space, it is 
logical that there would be no differences in processing time when considering only those 
offenders committed to placements. It makes substantive sense to disaggregate those 
going to placement from those returning to the community. Logistic analysis (not shown) 
o f disaggregated data does not show any differences in case processing times between 
court types, with regard to community disposition or residential commitment. Overall, 
this model cannot account for much of the variation in case processing time.









* Standard error in parentheses
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Detention Stav
Bureaucracy would predict shorter detention stays because of the overriding goal 
o f efficiency. On the other hand, family court, with a comprehensive approach to the 
child and the family, would predict longer detention stays, so that the needs of the child 
and his family can be more fully investigated.
4. Periods o f detention are shorter in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(bureaucratic prediction).
Periods o f detention are longer in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(rehabilitation prediction).
Table 9 shows the result o f OLS regression. As discussed, court type was entered 
first into the model and all other variables were entered in a second step. Backward 
elimination was used to determine variables significantly related to the log of detention 
stays. Only two variables were significant: court type and educational disability. The 
model is significant (F = 9.44, pc.OO) and explains approximately 9% o f the variation in 
the log of detention stay. Standardized coefficients reveal that court type is more strongly 
related to the log of the number o f days detained than is educational disability. Because 
the dependent variable was transformed, predicted probabilities were calculated and an 
antilog was taken to put the variable back into its natural units (days) to assist in 
interpretation. Results of that analysis are shown in Table 10.
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* Standard errors in parentheses 
± Family court is coded as 1.
For this analysis, educational disability was held constant and predicted 
probabilities were computed for district court and family court. To obtain the antilog, 
results from the predicted probability were multiplied by a factor of 10. The power 
transformation has corrected the skew and outliers, and predicts that offenders with no 
educational disability from district court will be detained for an average of nine days. 
Conversely, the same types of offenders from family court are predicted to be detained 
for an average of eleven days. When offenders have educational disabilities, the predicted 
mean number o f days detained in both courts increases. In district court, offenders with 
educational disabilities are predicted to be detained for an average of eleven days, while 
in family court the same types of offenders are predicted to be detained for an average of 
thirteen days. There is a difference of two days in each analysis, and this difference is 
statistically significant. In sum, court type and educational disabilities are the only 
variables related to length o f detention stay. Controlling for educational disability, youth 
from family courts are significantly more likely to be detained for longer periods of time.
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Table 10: Predicted Probabilities of Length of Detention Stay
Log Predicted Probability Number of Days Detained
No Educational Disability
District Court .92 9
Family Court 1.12 11
Educational Disability
District Court 1.12 11
Family Court 1.33 13
Plea Bargains
Bureaucracy would predict more plea bargains in family court because plea 
bargains increase efficiency in processing cases. On the other hand, a rehabilitation 
orientation would predict fewer plea bargains as a holistic approach would necessarily 
involve probation officers and judges m decision making, not just prosecutors and 
defense attorneys who may not know each family's situation as well as the judge or the 
probation officer.
5. There are more plea bargains in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(bureaucratic prediction).
There are fewer plea bargains in family courts as opposed to district courts 
(rehabilitation prediction).
Table 11 shows the results o f a logistic analysis o f plea bargains. As with other 
analyses, court type was entered as the first step in the equation. All other variables were 
entered next and backward elimination utilizing the likelihood ratio technique was 
conducted because o f the small study size. While the model is significant (lr x*= 31.25, 
p<.00), there is a lot of variation in plea bargains that is not explained by these variables
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(pseudo R2 = .18). Court type is significantly related to the odds o f plea bargains. Cases 
from family court are 40% as likely than cases from district court to be plea bargained 
taking into account multiple charges, prior offenses, and diagnoses. In addition to court 
type, the main variable of interest, several other variables were significantly related to the 
odds o f plea bargains. Court files that include multiple charges are 3.4 times more likely 
to be plea bargained than files without multiple charges when controlling for mental 
health/substance abuse diagnosis, court type, and number of prior offenses. Cases which 
involve youth with mental health or substance diagnoses are 43% as likely to be plea 
bargained in family court as in district court, holding all other variables constant.
In sum, cases that contain multiple charges and more prior offenses from district 
court coupled with no diagnoses of mental health or substance abuse issues are most 
likely to be plea bargained. This analysis lends support to the rehabilitation prediction of 
fewer plea bargains in family court. A holistic consideration of offenders’ needs would 
not necessarily be addressed through plea bargains.
Table 11: Multivariate Analysis o f Plea Bargains*
Odds Ratio Significance
Court Type .40 (•36) .01
Multiple Charges 3.39 (.49) .00
MH/SADx .43 (.37) .02
Prior Offenses .76 (.16) .09
LR Chi-Square 31.25
Pseudo R2 .18
♦Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Assessments
A bureaucratic prediction about assessments would posit that uniformity and 
consistency are the most efficient means of processing offenders. Evaluations and 
assessments, therefore, would be unnecessary and inefficient. Alternatively, a 
rehabilitation prediction would stress individualization and the need to know more about 
the offender in order to make appropriate case processing decisions.
6. There are fewer evaluations and assessments on cases in family court as opposed to 
district court (bureaucratic prediction).
There are more evaluations/assessments on cases in family court as opposed to district 
court (rehabilitation prediction).
Table 12 displays the results of the logistic regression analysis. As mentioned, 
court type was entered first and backward selection was used to uncover other variables 
significantly related to the probability of court ordered assessments. The model itself is 
significant (lr x2 = 64.10, p<.00) and explains approximately one third of the variation in 
court ordered assessments (pseudo R2=.33). Those cases processed in family court are 
2.9 times more likely to include an evaluation or assessment, when controlling for a pre­
existing mental health/substance abuse diagnosis, school issues, and age. Cases involving 
youth who have negative school issues are 2.5 times more likely to include a court- 
ordered assessment when controlling for court type, diagnoses, and age. Files that include 
youth who have a mental health and/or substance abuse diagnosis are 11 times more 
likely to have a court-ordered assessment, all other factors being equal Finally, cases 
involving younger offenders are 1.81 times less likely to have a court-ordered assessment
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when noted school issues, court type and mental health/substance abuse diagnoses are 
held constant.
In sum, family court cases in which youth have a pre-existing diagnosis, have 
noted problems in school, and are older, are more likely to contain a court-ordered 
assessment. This analysis gives support to an individualistic prediction: family courts are 
significantly more likely to assess individual cases presented to them as opposed to the 
traditional district court system.
Table 12: Multivariate Analysis of Assessments*
Odds Ratio Significance
Court Type 2.88 (.41) .01
School Issues 2.52 (.44) .03
MH/SADx 10.64 (.43) .00
Age .55 (.20) .00
LR Chi-Square 64.10
Pseudo R2 .33
* Standard errors are in parentheses.
Dispositional Outcome 
As discussed, almost all research on court processing, whether at the juvenile or 
the adult level, focuses on sentencing outcomes. Arguably, sentencing is the most 
important outcome that courts produce. Their sentencing actions determine the fate of the 
defendants before them. Recall from the previous chapter that utilization of a two-stage 
modeling procedure was discussed as inappropriate because 62% of these cases were 
disposed of at or prior to adjudication. Further, the fact that courts do not perform intake 
functions (Le. determine which youth will receive a formal court petition) also
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demonstrates that the two-stage modeling procedure is unwarranted for this study 
population.
Shown in Table 13 is the logistic model o f dispositional outcome. Remember that 
dispositional outcome was recoded to release or commitment. Like other models, court 
type was entered first and backward selection was used for all other variables. The model 
is significant (Ir = 48.14, p<.00) and explains approximately 27% of the variance in 
dispositioa Offenders from family court are slightly more likely to be committed at 
sentencing as offenders from district court, but the difference is not statistically 
significant (p=.38). There are other factors that predict dispositional outcome.
Cases which involve a youth with a mental health or substance abuse diagnosis 
are 2.3 times more likely to incur a dispositional commitment, all other factors remaining 
equal. Cases which have been plea bargained are two times more likely to be released, all 
other things being equal. For each prior offense contained in a case, up to three offenses, 
youth are 2.S times more likely to be sent to a residential facility or YDC, holding 
constant mental health/substance abuse diagnoses, plea bargains, and offense severity. 
Finally, cases involving youth with more severe offenses are more likely to receive more 
severe sentences, holding constant all other factors.
In sum, neither the bureaucratic nor the rehabilitation hypothesis is supported. 
Dispositional outcome does not differ by court type. Rather, important factors in 
disposition include mental health/substance abuse diagnoses, plea bargains, prior 
offenses, and offense severity. While no previous studies have investigated the effect of 
court type on sentencing outcomes, there is some support for the influences of prior 
offenses on sentencing (Le. Bailey and Peterson, 1981; Carter and Clelland, 1979;
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Thomberry, 1979), offense severity (Le. Berger and Hoffinan, 1995; Clarke and Koch, 
1980), and only recently mental health and school problems (Fader, et al., 2001).
Table 13: Multivariate Analysis o f Dispositional Outcome*
Odds Ratio Significance
Court Type 1.42 (.40) .38
MH/SA Dx 2.47 (.41) .03
Plea Bargain .50 (.41) .09
Prior Offenses 2.51 (.19) .00
Offense Severity 1.62 (.24) .04
LR Chi-Square 48.14
Pseudo R2 .27
* Standard errors shown in parentheses
As noted, the dependent variable in this analysis was dichotomized because of 
problems with sparse combinations of x and y variables, which render the resulting model 
unstable (Long, 1997). Dichotomizadon results in a loss o f efficiency, but it is useful in 
this analysis to examine the bivariate relationships between court type and dispositional 
outcome as an ordinal variable. Table 14 displays these results.
The bivariate relationship between court type and dispositional outcome is 
significant (x ^  10.310, p<.05), though the relationship is not straightforward. Family 
courts are more likely than district court to give youth probation for six months and 
under, while district courts are more likely than family courts to release offenders into the 
community on probation for over one year. Family courts are more likely to commit 
youth to residential facilities than are district courts, while district courts are slightly 
more likely to commit youth to the training school From this analysis, a question of 
whether residential facilities are seen as therapeutic arises. Do judges deem commitment
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to facilities that will address specific issues (Le. substance abuse, educational problems, 
pregnancy) as therapeutic? If so, it certainly would seem that family courts support such 
an ideal A logistic model using residential facility as the category o f interest and all other 
values as the reference category was run (analysis not shown). The model however, 
failed to show strong or significant relationships between court type and residential 
facility commitment. Court type did not matter when controlling for other factors. More 
data is needed and should be a task for future research.
Further, the present study operationalized dispositional outcome like some prior 
research, dichotomizing release/outcome (i.e. Bailey and Peterson, 1981; Bishop and 
Frazier, 1996; Cohen and Kluegel 1979b; Frazier and Bishop, 1992). Results show no 
difference between court types. One possible explanation for the lack of significant 
findings is that regardless of court system, there are limited options available to judges in 
any court system and that all courts compete for the same commitment services. In other 
words, there is little variation to start, and therefore it is more difficult to see any 
differences that occur between court systems.
Table 14: Ordinal Dispositional Outcomes by Court Type
Dispositional Outcome District Court (n=76) Family Court (n=76)
Probation: 
less than or equal to 6mo.
9% (7) 15% (11)
Probation: 
over 6 mo. & up to 1 yr.
33% (25) 32% (24)
Probation: over 1 yr. 18% (14) 4% (3)
Residential Facility 25% (19) 38% (29)
Youth Development Center 15% (11) 12% (9)
10.31, p<.05
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Summary
Overall, the rehabilitation predictions were supported more often in these analyses 
than the bureaucratic predictions (See Table 15 for summary). The influence of court 
structure, however, was not universal. Youth from family courts are held in detention for 
longer periods o f time. This may be an unintended consequence of bureaucracy, or it may 
be that family courts, because judges hear all aspects of families’ cases, know families 
better and are less likely to release offenders back into ‘dysfunctional’ homes.
In line with the rehabilitation prediction, family courts are more likely to order 
assessments than district courts. It is logical that younger offenders do not have as 
extensive a court history or as many assessments as older offenders and are more likely to 
receive an evaluation. Presumably, those youth with pre-existing diagnoses do have a 
‘paper trail’ that follows them into court, but the fact that the court wants its own 
assessment may reflect the difficult nature of diagnosis. For instance, a youth who was 
diagnosed with depression two years ago, but ceased going to a therapist last year may no 
longer have that label. The court, however, may want to hear from a mental health 
professional in order to appropriately treat the youth.
Also supporting a rehabilitation prediction is the fact that family courts are less 
likely to plea bargain cases than district courts. As discussed, this finding does not 
support the bureaucratic ideal of efficiency. Instead, the finding suggest a holistic 
approach to the court process in which judges may not believe that plea bargains are in 
the best interests o f the child or the family.
Ultimately, the analysis o f dispositional outcome shows that there are no 
differences between court systems in whether detained offenders are released back into
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the community on probation or committed to residential facilities/YDC. Thus, neither the 
bureaucratic nor the rehabilitation proposition was supported. Though the more detailed 
bivariate analysis does show that family courts are more likely to commit youth to 
residential facilities, an extrapolation for support of either prediction cannot be made. 
That is, while on the surface, commitment may seem to be a more punitive consequence 
for youth, it may be seen as the only place for services. As one probation officer states 
"There is no good drug treatment program in the community. In fact, the best drug 
treatment around is at YDC” (Probation Officer G.K., 10/21/01). In addition, there are 
not many options for disposition of cases. Judges must choose among a small number of 
alternatives (probation, residential treatment, YDC). Thus, because there are so few 
dispositional alternatives anyway, one may expect that the corresponding variation in 
dispositions meted out between court types is small.
Table IS: Summary of Support for Predictions
Dependent Variable Rehabilitation Bureaucracy Neither





Taken all together, court type plays a role in the majority of these models. Also, 
whether cases contained a mental health or substance abuse diagnosis was significant in 
all but one of the multivariate models. The fact that cases with pre-existing mental health 
or substance abuse diagnoses are more likely to be assessed may reflect, regardless of 
court type, the courts’ overriding concern of addressing the needs of offenders. 
Educational disabilities, negative school issues, and negative family issues also were
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significant in several models. Legal factors of offense severity and prior offenses did not 
play a prominent role in all of these models. If the juvenile justice system as a whole is 
moving toward a more retributive model, then that should be reflected in processing 
practices that emphasize legal variables, such as offense seriousness and prior offense 
history, over extra-legal variables, such as educational disability and mental 
health/substance abuse diagnoses. These analyses show that the collective New 
Hampshire 'court’ may still be rehabilitatively oriented.
This analysis demonstrates that court processing studies should examine 
intermediary court outputs, and consider other factors in court processing. Factors rarely 
examined, but shown to be important are a pre-existing mental health/substance abuse 
diagnosis, negative school and family issues, and, of course, court structure.
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION & POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Without regard to theoretical orientation, it would be wise to include court 
structure as a variable in future research as demonstrated here. Stapleton, Aday, and Ito 
(1982) make clear that “case outcomes and the determinants of decision making in 
juvenile justice should not be interpreted without knowledge of structure and procedure” 
(p. 560). While 40% of US states have at least two different court structures that hear 
juvenile cases (National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2002), to this point in the literature, 
there has been little empirical attention to the possible differential effects of court 
structure. Prior studies tended to have focused on one or two courts, and this research 
showed that there were some systematic differences occurring across different court 
types. Second, while the sentencing decision is clearly the most important judgment 
courts make, there are other decision points that need to be examined. Detention stays, 
plea bargains, and assessments warrant further discussion.
Detention Stay. The median length of detention stay in this study was 
approximately two weeks, and family court held youth in detention for significantly 
longer periods o f time. Two weeks certainty can be regarded as a long time to be out of 
the home, absent from regular schooling, and away from the community. Over half o f 
these detainees, regardless of court type, subsequently received a community sentence at 
disposition.
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Questions beyond variation length of detention stay need be addressed, regardless 
of court type. Specifically, do these youth need to be held in detention in the first place, 
and do they need to be held for such long periods o f time? Compounding this issue is 
that, while all juvenile offenders are required to receive educational services in detention, 
the majority of offenders in this study struggled with school as evidenced by the number 
of them with educational disabilities (63%). Moreover, services that youth may have been 
receiving in the community, such as counseling, may not be readily available in 
detention, and with regard to the example cited, certainly not with the same counselor. 
One may assume that offenders need an adjustment period when returning home from a 
relatively long period of detention stay. With the current national focus on prisoner 
reentry and necessary services for successful readjustment to community life (Petersilia, 
2000; Travis, Solomon, and Waul, 2001), perhaps consideration for re-entry services 
needs to be extended to detainees as well
Plea Bargains. While plea bargains are commonplace in many juvenile courts, 
they are a little researched aspect o f the juvenile justice system (Sanborn, 1993). Sanborn 
(1993) found that judges from certain geographical areas were unwilling to give up 
power. In the present study, the feet that plea bargains occur less frequently in family 
court may reflect the feet that judges are unwilling to give up decisions for children 
because they are specialized in dealing with offenders needs. They may perceive 
attorneys as unable to fulfill that role. Ultimately, plea bargains matter in disposition, and 
they should be a control variable in any case processing study. As discussed by Sanborn 
(1992), plea bargains also warrant further investigation on their own merits.
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Assessments. Court ordered assessments ostensibly assist the judiciary by 
providing more information, and many times recommendations, about the offender and/or 
the offenders’ family. As shown here, while there was a significant difference in the types 
of courts that utilized assessments, there were no differences in sentencing outcomes. 
There may be, however, some differences in how offenders with and without assessments 
are treated after disposition. It could be that assessments provide a lagged affect, positive 
or negative, on the treatment o f youth in the juvenile justice correctional system. Future 
research that conducts more detailed analysis will uncover how assessments affect 
decision making and youth outcomes during the tenure of their juvenile justice system 
involvement.
Summary
This study has shown that court structure influenced how detained juveniles were 
processed through the juvenile justice system in New Hampshire. Results showed that 
whether or not an instrument o f detention reform was overridden depended on court type. 
Court type proved to be a relatively strong and significant factor in explaining the length 
of detention stay, the use o f plea bargaining, and the use of court ordered assessments. 
While court type had some influence in the length of case processing time, it was not 
significant. Court type was not influential or significant in explaining sentencing 
outcome.
The present study included refined elements o f bureaucracy and elements from 
penal theory as the basis for comparison across court systems. Research results showed 
that rehabilitation predictions were supported more often than the bureaucratic 
predictions. Where there was a difference between family court and district court, results
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followed rehabilitation predictions, though support for either approach was not found 
consistently. This study demonstrates that family courts in New Hampshire do seem to be 
meeting the goals of individualized justice in multiple ways. Family courts hold youth in 
detention longer, are less likely to accept plea bargains, and are more likely to order 
assessments. In the end, however, these differences do not necessarily translate into more 
rehabilitative sentences.
Bureaucracy & Rehabilitation Reprise 
The conceptual framework used in this study is deserving of further discussion. 
While it is generally accepted that contemporary bureaucracy does not operate as 
mechanistic as Weber presupposed (for relation to the criminal justice system, see 
Chambliss and Seidman, 1971), the overall lack o f support for bureaucratic predictions 
may seem surprising. Implementation o f a RAI would certainty seem consistent with 
bureaucratic ideals o f predictability, calculability, consistency, and efficiency. As 
revealed here, however, family court was more resistant to implementation, at least 
within the first six months of the pilot implementation period. These preliminary findings 
are tentative given the short evaluation period and the small study size in a single state, 
yet they may support the idea of a more rehabilitatively oriented family court that resists 
efforts to limit discretion and the ability to address individual offenders’ needs. Emerson 
(1969) affirms this idea, noting that judges who are committed to the rehabilitative ideal 
see legal issues and other initiatives as secondary to rehabilitative efforts.
A further assertion could be made that the lack of support for bureaucratic 
predictions is due to geographical constraints. There is little variation between court sizes 
in this study. The largest court in this research encompasses a jurisdiction of only
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125,000 people, and more rural areas have been the study of little systematic research 
(Butts and DeMuro, 1989; Eisenstein and Jacob, 1987; Maupin and Bond-Maupin, 1999). 
While urban court jurisdictions sizes have been operationalized differently, they 
generally consist o f populations o f500,000 or greater (See Feld, 1991; Myers and 
Talarico, 1986). Both Feld (1991) and Hagan (1977) in their examination o f juvenile 
courts made the claim that more urban areas are by nature more bureaucratic than rural 
areas. As discussed, however, urbanization cannot be equated with bureaucratization, and 
claims about the effects of population density are separate issues (See Myers and 
Talarico, 1986). In this study, no court would meet the definition of urban, and thus 
elements of bureaucracy may not operate in the same way as in more populous areas. 
Ultimately, bureaucracy may still play a role in how offenders’ cases are processed, but 
that certainty can be mediated by court structure.
Judicial ideologies may influence the way courts operate, regardless of structure. 
Indeed, more robust sociological perspectives see an interplay between the structure and 
the individual, and modem conceptualizations o f bureaucracy allow for the influence of 
individuals within a constrained environment, such as the perspective advocated by neo­
institutionalists (See generally, March, 1981, in Van de Ven and Joyce; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1983). Even if judges in family court are more rehabilitativety oriented than 
judges in district court, it is the structure that allows for those differences to surface. This 
study does not dispute individual influence, rather its aim was to explore the structural 
relationships between the theoretical tenets o f bureaucracy and penal orientations.
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Limitations o f Study 
This study is limited most clearly by limited measures of rehabilitative intent and 
elements o f bureaucracy. Theoretical constructs contained herein need further refinement. 
Bureaucracy measurement suffers from unclear operationalization. This research 
eliminates the proxy measure of urbanization for bureaucracy (See, for example, Hagan, 
1977) and controls for urban/rural areas. Family courts are more bureaucratic as shown 
through indicators from past research, yet the full measurement o f bureaucracy is elusive 
(Scott, 1995). Further, both rehabilitation and bureaucracy may well embody more 
complex relationships than shown here. Longer detention stays, for instance, could be an 
unintended consequence of rehabilitative/bureaucratic measures.
Further investigation of court processing using the variable of court structure 
should be conducted and completed outside the one state and the areas used here. The 
study also only examines those youth who are detained and thus selection bias limits 
generalizability to other delinquents. Previous studies have found significant indirect 
effects of discrimination against ethnic minorities in court processing (i.e Bishop and 
Frazier, 1996). Because the absolute number of youth and the relative number of ethnic 
minorities processed through the system in this study is small, these affects, if present, 
may be difficult to detect. Selection bias also may mask indirect effects of discrimination.
Different levels of analyses are mixed in this study. Individual case level data is 
analyzed alongside court level data, violating the regression assumption that all 
explanatory variables are independent, or free to vary. The results of violating this 
assumption could manifest in muhicollinearity between individual level and aggregate 
level data or biased tests o f aggregate level null hypotheses because these tests are based
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on the number of individuals, rather than the number of aggregates (Wooldredge, Griffin, 
and Pratt, 2001). For this analysis, muhicollinearity does not appear to be a problem. The 
second potential result, however, is perhaps more serious. Caution must be used in 
extending influences due to court type.
Finally, this study takes into account only a snapshot of delinquent careers. This is 
particularly significant for youth who had previous court involvement. The act of 
detention as well as past placements may influence how the court reacts to youth (See 
Thomberry and Christenson, 1984). Where possible, research examining case processing 
should add controls for previous outcomes, and if prior commitments/placements are 
significant, model the process.
Policy Implications
This research has policy implications for the State of New Hampshire and, more 
broadly, for interests on a national level. The policy concerns laid out below address the 
juvenile justice reform efforts o f detention screening instruments and court structures.
RAI
As may be expected, the RAI has not been the first attempt at juvenile justice 
system reform in the State of New Hampshire. In 1993, the State adopted YDC 
dispositional guidelines to address overcrowding issues. Much like the content of the 
RAI, those guidelines focused on limiting entrance to the training school through 
objective criteria weighing almost exclusively on the legal variables o f offense severity 
and prior offenses. An analysis a year after implementation showed that the screening 
tool had little impact on commitment (Barton, 1997). In feet, the instrument was 
overridden 69% o f the time (Barton, 1997). The author o f the report attributed a lack of
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successful implementation to the difficulty in obtaining a consensus about who should be 
admitted to YDC, lack of leadership for the project, and the absence of external rewards 
or sanctions for compliance with the mandate. The same could be said about the current 
effort with regard to detention reform.
The RAI is not being used consistently and when it is used, it is often overridden. 
There may be several factors that account for the inconsistency in use. While judges 
ultimately determine who will be detained, it is up to individual police officers and 
probation officers to complete the form. Judges are directed to ask for the score on the 
form prior to making a decision. This does not always happen. As one judge states, “If I 
get a call at three o'clock in the morning, I’m not thinking about what the score on the 
form is. If the police officer has a good reason to detain, then I will accept that. It isn’t 
like there is a wealth o f other options for the juvenile. I don’t think any judge likes to 
place kids in detention, but sometimes there’s just no choice” (Judge A, 2001). A 
probation officer from a very rural part of Grafton County expressed another problem 
with instrument use. He stated that many small town officers are part time and they don’t 
see juveniles enough to know about the process of detention, let alone the knowledge of a 
screening tool (Probation Officer S.N., personal communication, 10/15/01). Clearly, 
training about the form is linked to successful implementation. Beyond this need, 
stakeholders must examine structural barriers (i.e. different court structures) to reform 
efforts. If  differences between family court and district court are further upheld, then 
addressing ‘detention reform’ must take into account ‘court reform’.
Specific policy recommendations for the RAI in New Hampshire are as follows:
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•  Keep the risk assessment in use.
• Train professionals to use it properly.
• Coordinate training., use, and data collection of RAI through a central location.
• Ensure through coordination that the form is being completed and that any 
override includes written justification.
Family Court
While all reform efforts may encounter resistance, particular resistance to the RAI 
can be examined within the larger structure of court type. Is there something specific 
about family courts that engenders resistance to such measures? Family courts ostensible 
purposes are rooted within the rehabilitative ideal As such, judicial discretion is a 
cornerstone o f effective intervention, scrutinizing the child, his/her family, school and 
community in order to create a plan that is in the best interests o f the child and family. 
Perhaps the risk assessment instrument, with its concomitant limit on discretion, detracts 
from the guiding philosophy of the family court. The question is one o f compatibility of 
reform efforts.
An answer, though for from definitive, may be found in penal theory. Feeley and 
Simon (1992) described a “new penology” that emerged in the 1980s as an actuarial 
system of risk management. According to them, new strategies o f corrections involved 
three significant changes: (1) the emergence o f probability and risk replacing clinical and 
retributive judgments; (2) a new objective o f efficient control o f system processes; (3) the 
development of new techniques to manage offenders as aggregates in place of 
individualizing or creating equity. The RAI is part of this movement to “identify, classify, 
and manage” youth sorted by level o f dangerousness. The authors made clear that these
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movements were not developed from the rehabilitative ideal and took the focus away 
from the individual. In fact, such a movement would seem to be congruent with 
bureaucratic principles.
With its outward focus on assisting the family unit, family court is the antithesis 
to such a movement. Moore and Wakeling (1997) point out that judges in family court 
are focused on which social services can help the family and are in the best interests of 
the child. Further research is needed to understand the interplay of reform efforts rooted 
in different philosophies. Perhaps the underlying and seemingly incompatible tenets of 
these efforts can successfully work together. I f  as some argue, discretion invites injustice 
(Le. Harris, 1984), then perhaps tools to limit discretion at certain stages (i.e. detention; 
training school commitment) can be part o f a checks and balances procedure to ensure the 
just, equitable treatment of youth while retaining the ability to individualize sentences to 
the needs of each offender.
The future of family court in New Hampshire is tenuous, at best. At the beginning 
o f the 2001 legislative session, the New Hampshire legislature voted not to fund the 
family court initiative (Representative Dowling, 2002). The State’s Supreme Court must 
now decide if and how family court will be funded. This research examined only one 
aspect of the family court system -  the processing of specific types of delinquent cases. 
Results showed that there was a difference in how family courts and district courts handle 
juvenile cases. Those differences, however, did not necessarily translate into any 
appreciable differences at sentencing.
From a fiscal standpoint, given that youth stay in detention longer, there are fewer 
plea bargains, and there are more court ordered assessments, family court is clearly more
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expensive. Other issues need to be examined, however, particularly offender functioning 
and recidivism. Though family courts may be more expensive to operate based on factors 
examined here, if as a result o f  going through the family court system, youth are better 
functioning and are less likely to recidivate, then that success will also translate into more 
cost savings. Future research should examine such outcomes.
Prior family court evaluations perhaps may foreshadow future events. The judicial 
council report that recommended a pilot family court project also acknowledge that the 
district courts may handle juvenile cases as well as family court (Resolution o f Family 
Issues in the Courts Study Committee, 1995). In the first evaluation of family court, the 
overriding concern according to interviews with court administration and staff was that 
the costs of statewide expansion were too expensive. Moreover, changes could be 
implemented at the district court (and superior court for marital cases) level to achieve 
the same goals as family court (Le. one family, one judge) (Solomon, 1997). In that same 
report, interviewees also stated that family court judges, because of the consolidation of 
district court jurisdictions, may not be as familiar with community services for juveniles 
and their families as district court judges. There are some visible seeds of ambivalence in 
the state with regard to the appropriateness of family court for juvenile delinquency 
cases.
Specific policy recommendations for the family court in New Hampshire are as 
follows:
• Keep the family court system in operation.
•  Assess differences in recidivism o f delinquents in district and family courts 
through an outcome evaluation.
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•  Facilitate movement out o f YDSU for youth, as detention stays are costly and 
most youth (55%) receive a community disposition.
• Evaluate other aspects o f the family court system (Le. divorce, child abuse and 
neglect, domestic violence) in comparison to the court structures in operation in 
the rest o f the State.
Conclusion
Clearly, there has been a legislative movement toward more punitive sanctions for 
juvenile offenders (Torbet and Szymanski, 1998). New Hampshire is no exception. Over 
the last several years, the state has reduced the age limit for criminal offenses from 18 
years old to 17 years old.8 It has added a judicial waiver clause that allows certain 
offenses to be tried in criminal court upon judicial approval. It has provided for 
concurrent jurisdiction of juvenile and adult cases, meaning that an offender who 
commits a crime as a juvenile can be transferred to the adult system once s/he becomes 
18. The adult system will take over the supervisory role for that offender. Finally, the 
State has waived confidentiality over certain offenses, meaning that offenders’ 
information is open to the public for certain crimes.
How legislative edicts transfer to judicial practices is another story. Feld (1992) 
states, “There is a strong nationwide movement, both in theory and in practice, away 
from therapeutic, individualized dispositions toward punitive, offense-based sentences”
(p. 76). At the same time, however, others discuss the rigid features of the original
‘ The legislature is currently considering a bill to change the age limit back to 18 because of die 
problems/con fusion the law has created surrounding the different ages for majority (18 years old) and for 
criminal offenses (17 years old).
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juvenile court. Krisberg and Austin (1993) state, “Although the political rhetoric may 
swing back and forth from punitive themes to rehabilitative values, actual court practices 
are remarkably resilient to change” (also see Rothman, 1980). If reliance on legal factors 
is indicative of more punitive courts (Le. Feld, 1992; Singer, 1996), then this research 
shows a more rehabilitative orientation by both court systems. Beyond type of court, 
legal factors clearly were not the most important variables shown to be related to court 
outcomes. Extra-legal factors, such as educational disability and mental health/substance 
abuse diagnoses, were. Thus, the processing of delinquents, at least in this state, shows 
that although the legislature has added punitive components, the court system is not 
moving in a punitive direction.
The need to continue to assess change, reform efforts and organizational 
interrelationships in the justice process is essential. While the juvenile justice system as a 
whole may be “resilient to change”, difference in processes do occur. Those differences 
may have lasting effects on individual offenders and their families and on the future 
direction of the juvenile justice system.
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OFFENSE RANKINGS -  ALPHABETICAL
Description LUSl
Aiding Criminal Acuviry £42:4..................................................................................................................1
Anas: G as A, occupied amcrure, actual occupants 634ul(Il) .................................................................... IV
d a s  A. occupied sunaure, so occupants 634:i(H).........................................................................IV
CamB «34:l(jn)........................................................................................................................ VL
Misdea«nci, other property under 81,000 £34:1(TV) ..................................................................... II
Asmult: Gass A, with a deadly weapon 631:l(IXb)........................................... IV
Gass A, serious bodiiy injury without a deadly wopon £3l:i(IXa) ....................................   C
Class A. serious bodily injuiy to a penes under 13 yean old 63 l:l(T)(d) .........................................01
3,2nd degree (injury with a deadly weapon or victim under 13) £31:2 ................................... 10
Misdemeanor, Simple Assault 631:2-a .......................................................................................... 0
Assault: Sexual. Oast A (aggravated) 632-A3(I) ......................................................................................IV
Sexual Costae, Cass A. victim under 13 £32«A3(ID ...................................................................01
Sexual. Cass B (serious personal injuiy) 632-AJ(I) ......................................................................IV
Sexual Class 3, victim 13-16, acnconsensual 632-AJ(II) .............................................................10
Sexual. Cass B. victim 13*16, consensual 632-AJ(H) ..................................................................... I
Sanai Caeno. Misdemeanor -  victim 13 or over, ncnconsensual 632-A.4 ........................................H
Sexual Costae. Misdemeanor -  vieim 13 or over, consensual 632-A:4.............................................. 1
Bad Checks: dam A 63«:4(IVXaXl) ........................................................................................................ H
CassB 638:4flVX*X3) ........................................................................................................ I
Bail lumping: Felony £42:8.......................................................................................................................0
Misdemeanor £42:8.............................................................................................................. 1
Breaches of the peace Riot £44:1(1)........................................................................................................... I
Riot-felony 644:XCIV) .........................................................................................H
Disorderly Conduct 644:2 ....................................................................................... 1
Harassment 644:4 .................................................................................................. 1
Abuse of Corpse 644:7 .......................................................................................... 3
Cruelty in Animals 644:8(a4) ................................................................................. I
Violation of Privacy 644:9 ........   I
C-imiuaiDeriunitioa 644:11  ........    . . . . . I
Refusing lo Yield Teitpbone in aa Emergency 644:12 ............................................... 1
W31Sil CancealmentfShcplifling 644:17 .................................................................. 1
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Burglary Qass A -  Occupied Stiucture/Nigbnime 633:1(11) .........................   HI
Anned/inflicts injuiy 633:1(11)........................................................................... m
Class B -  633:1(11) ......................................................................................................... II
Carrying Pistol or Revolver without a License 159:4 .............................................................................in
Causing Injuiy (purpomly) resulting in miscarriage or still birth 63 l:l(IXc) ............................................. IV
Causing or Aiding Suicide 630:4 ..................................................................................................... QI
Changing Mails on a Firearm (serial number, etc.) 159:13 ......................................................................II
Compounding 642:3 ........................................................................................................................1
Computer Crime: Class A 638:17 ..................................................................................................... H
Class B 638:17 .................................................................................................... H
Misdemeanor, under 3300 638:17 ..............................................................................1
Concealing Death of Newborn 639:5 ...................................................................................................H
Courtroom Security/Possession of dangerous weapon in courtroom or courtroom area 139:19 ...................... m
Criminal Mischief Felony 634:2(11) ..................................................................................................H
Misdemeanor 634:2(111) ........................................................................................ I
Criminal Restraint 633:2 ................................................................................................................ IV
Criminal Threatening 631:4 ...................................................................   I
Criminal Trespass 635:2 ...................................................................................................................1
Criminal Use of Piswl Cane or Sword Cane: Misdemeanor 159:19-a(I) .................................................... H
Felony 15 9:I9-a(II)....................   m
Drugs: Cocaine: Sales (over 5 oz.) 318-B:26(D(a)....................................................................IV
Sales (1/2 oz.-5 oz.) 3 ll-8 :26(I)(b) ..............................................................HI
Sales (less than 1/2 oz.) 318-B:26<D(c)..........................................................HI .
Possession 318*BJ6QIXa) ........................................................................... I
Hashish: Sales (1 lb. or more) 3I8-B:26(IXb) ...............................................................QI
Sales (5 gnms -1 lb) 31W:26<I)(c) ........................................................... E
Sales (less than 5 grams) 3l8-B:26(I)(d)........................................................ Q
Possession (5 gnms or more) 318-S:26(II)(c)................................................... I
Possession (less than 3 gnms) 3 lS-B:26(II)(e)................................................. I
. Heroin: Sales (over 5 grams) 3 18-B:26(I)(a) ............................................................ IV
Sales (1-5 grams) 31S-B:26(I)(b) .................................   E
Sales (less than 1 gam) 3lS*S:26(IXc)...........      E
Possession 31S-B:26(IIXa) ......................   I
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LSD: Sales (over 100 milligrams) 3IS-8:26(IXa) ................................................... IV
Sales (less than 100 milligrams) 3H-B:26(I)(b) .............................................. IE
Possession 3l8-B:26(IIXa) ..................................  I
Marijuana: Sales (5 lbs. or coo re) 3l8-B:26(I)(b) ............................................................. QI
Sales (1 oz. • 5 lbs.) 3I*B:26(I)(c) .............................................................. QI
Sales (less than 1 oz) 31S-B:2£<IX<f) .............................................................E
Possession 31**B:26(IIXd) ..........................................................................I
Methamphetamine: Sales (1 oz. or more) 3 l*-3:26(I)(b) .......................................................... QI
Sales (less than I oz.) 3lS>B:26(I)(c) ........................................................QI
Possession 318*8:26(II)(a)......................................................   I
• PC?: Sales (over 10 grams) 3lS-B:26(I)(a) ........................................................... rv
Sales (lea than 10 grams) 31S-B:26(I)(b) .....................................................QI
Possession 318-B:26<ll)(a) ..........................................................................I
Other Schedule I-IV Drags: Sales (I oz. or more) 31S-B.26<I)(b) .................................................QI
Sales (less than 1 oz.) 3I8-B:26(I)(c).............................................. QI
Possession 3 lS-B:26(II)(a) ............................................................ I
Schedule V Drugs: Sales 3 tS-B:26<IXd) .................................................................................Q
Possession 3IS-B 6^<IIXb) ....................................................................... I
Drag Business, Use of Minors in 318-BJ6(VU)....................................................................................IV
Drag Enterprise Leader 3Ig-8:26(VI) ................................................................................................IV
Electronic Defense Weapons (stun gun) 159:23 ....................................................................................IQ
Endangering the Welfare of a Minor 639:3 ........................................................................................... 1
Endangering the Wellhre of a Minor-oon-support 639:4 .........................................................................1
Escape: Class A, employs force 642:6(11)........................................................................................... IV
Class B 642:6(1)..........   Q
False Alarm: Class B— False Public Alarms 644:2 .............................................................................. Q
False Fire Alarms 6 4 4 ..........................................................................  Q
False Fue Alarms/Death or Injury Resulting (felony) 644:3-b ................................ QI
Interference w/Fire Alarm Apparatus 644:3-e......................................................Q
False Imprisonment 6333 .................................................................................................................. 1
False Information (Purchasing firearms) 159:11 ...........................................................................  Q
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Falsifiation: Class B.Petjury 641:1 ......................................................   H
Class B, Tampering with Witness 641:5 ..........................................................................HI
Misdemeanor -  False Swearing 641:2 .............................................................................. 1
Unsworn Falsification 641:3 .........................................  I
False Reports to Law Enforcement 641:4 ....................................................I
Falsifying Physical Evidence 641:6 ....................................................................................................H
Firearm. Felonious Use of 650- A: 1 ..........................................................-....................................... EH
Forgery: Gass B 63S:1(I-HI) ............................................................................................................n
Misdemeanor 63S:1(IV)...................................................................................................... I
Fraudulent Handling of Recordable Writings 638:2 ...............................................................................H
Fraudulent Use of Credit Card: Gass A & B 638:5 ...............................................................................II
Misdemeanor 638:5 ............................................................................1
Hindering Apprehension: (Underlying Offense Class A felony) 642J(II)...................................................H
(Underlying Offense Class B felony or lower) 642:3(1)........................................ I
Homicide: Capital Murder 630:1 ..................................................................................................... IV
1st Degree Murder 630:l<a ............................................................................................ IV
2nd Degree Murder 630:1-b ...........................................................................................IV
Indecent Exposure 645:1(1) ................................................................................................................I
Indecent Exposure in presence of Child under 16 yean old 642:1(11) ........................................................... I
interference with Cemetery or Burial Ground 635:6 ...............................................................................H
Interference with Custody: Felony 633:4(1) ......  II
Misdemeanor 633:4(11) ............................................................................. I
Kidnapping: Class A felony 633:1(0 ................................................................................................ IV
Class 3, victim released without injury 633:1(11) ...............................................................m
Manslaughter 630:2 ....................................................................   IV
Negligent Homicide 630:3 ...............................................................................................................HI
Obstructing Government Adminisuation 642:1 ..................................................................................... I
Pomesaon of Burglary Tools 635:1(V)................................................................................................. I
Possession of Forged Instrument 638:1(V) ............................................................................................I
Possession of Implements of Escape 642:7 .......................................................................................... II
Possession of Weapons 159:15...........................................................................................................D
Prostitution 645:1  —  I
Reckless Conduct 631:3 ....................  II
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Resisting Arrest • Detention 642:2 ..................................................................................................... 1
Robbery: Class A 636:1011)............................................................................................................ ™
Gass 3 • Unarmed/no injury 636:10) ................................................................................. ®
Sale of Firearms to Minor 159:12 ......................................................................................................HI
Sale of Firearms without License 159:10 ............................................................................................ m
Sale of Martial Arts Weapons 159:24 ..................................................................................................n
Sale of Weapons (generally) 159:16 ......................................................... , ....................................... H
Special Bullets, Felonious Use of 159:18 ............................................................................................ E
Tampering with Public Records 641:7 ................................................................................................ H
Theft: 637:3 -  Felony ..................................................................................................................... n
Misdemeanor............................................................................................................ I
637:4 .~3y Deception — Felony................................................................ H
Misdemeanor ...................................................................................I
637:5 ,„3y Extortion -  Felony...............................................................................................II
Misdemeanor ...................................................................................I
637:6 ...Lost or Mislaid Property — Felony ................................................................................U
Misdemeanor ................................................................... I
637:7 Receiving Stolen Property -  Felony ................................................................................ II
Misdemeanor ................................................................... I
637:7-a Possession of property without serial number .................................................................... I
637:8 Theft of Services -  Felony ............................................................................................H
Misdemeanor................................................................................ I
637:10 „.By Misapplication of Property......................................................................................I
Unauthorized Use of Propelled Motor Vehide or Animal (joyriding) 634:3 ..................................................I
Unauthorized Use of Propelled Motor Vehide or Rented Property 637'3 ......................................................I
Unlawful Possesion or Sale of Gravestones 635:7 ................................................................................ U
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DIAGNOSTIC GRAPHS
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APPENDIX D
RISK ASSESSMENT SCREENING INSTRUMENT
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Date Screened /  Time
Last Name First Middle AKA
Number and S treet Telephone
City, S tate , ZIP
Race Gender 
Student at: (Name of school and address)
D.O.B.
Emoioved b v : (Name of company and address)
Grade
Custodial Parent /  Guardian Non-Custodiai Parent
Number and S tre e t Number and S treet
City, S ta te . ZIP City, S tate , ZIP
(H) m (H) (W)
Telephone Number(s) Telephone Number(s)
Alleged P resent O ffense(s). (Specify level and class /  Felony, M isdem eanor A, B, etc.)
Regarding the juvenile, did th e  arresting /  investigating officer observe evidence of: 
alcohol abuse? □  Yes □  No drug abuse? □  Y es □  No
Law Enforcem ent A gency O fficer's Name and 10 or Badge No. (officer w ho com pletes th is form)
YES/NO
JPPO District Office C ontacted
Did the arresting officer note any signs or symptom s of suicidal
ideation or actions? □  Y es □  No
AOC-324-048 (06/00)
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Parent/Guardian Interviewed Prior Juvenile Convictions or Diversion G  Yes □  No 
O  Yes D No
1  1. Face to  Face
□  2 . Telephone
G  3 . Unable to  Contact
□  4 . Message Left With Whom:
Specify Court, Law Enforcement Agency
Juvenile Contacts (Counseled and released) G  Yes G  No
Specify Law Enforcement Agency
Name Relationship to Juvenile
Juvenile Record Check: 0  Yes G  Not Available □  No Priors
II. ADMISSION CRITERIA
If answered in the affirmative, th e  following criteria indicate the youth 's potential 
eligibility for detention.
G  Yes G No *. The youth is alleged to be an escapee from jail, youth attendant program.
shelter care, YDSU. an absconder from a residential program, or the child 
is warned in another jurisdiction for an offense which if committed by an 
adult, would be a felony;
G  Yes G No 2. The youth has been charged with a delinquent act or violation of law and
requests in writing through legal counsel to be detained for protection from 
an imminent physical threat to his/her personal safety latacn 
documentation):
G  Yes G No 3. The youth is eharged with a capital crime, a Class A Felony, a Class 3
Felony or Felony violation under chapter 318-B;
G  Yes G  No 4. The youth is charged with a Oass A Misdemeanor or any offense involving
the use of firearm if one of the factors set forth below exists:
ycuth has a record of failure to appear at court hearings after 
being property notified in accordance with the rules of juvenile 
procedure;
youth has a record of law violations prior to court hearings; 
youth has already been detained or has been released and is 
awaiting final disposition of his ease;
youth has a record of violent conduct resulting in physical injury to 
others;
youth found to be in possession of a firearm or other deadly 
weapon; or
0  Yes G  No la)
□  Yes □  No (b)
□  Yes □  No (c)
□  Yes □  No Id)
□  Yes G No (e)
□  Yes □  No If)
AOC-324-048 (OfiCO)
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A youth delivered with a judicial order requiring daemon nos be demined. The screening mammas sdU ana be 
completed for informational purposes, bu: the youth m at be detained regardless c f the point score.
•»9mm
111. RISK ASSESSMENT
A. Most serious current offense
1. All capital, first degree, second degree homicides and manslaughter: or 1 5 _____
2. All level IV offenses under YOC Eligibility Guidelines or youth is 15 _ _ _  
wanted by another jurisdiction for a felony offense; or
3. All level 111 offenses under YOC Eligibility Guidelines; or 8 ______
4 . All level II offenses iCIass A Misdemeanors only) under YDC Eligibility A ______
Guidelines and any misdemeanors charged as Class A.
S. Other pending charges (separate, non-related events occurring prior to  instant offense!.
Pending charges are charges on which a juvenile is awaiting an adjudicatory or 
dispositional hearing.
1. Prior felony arrest within last seven days 6 ______
2. Each felony • 2 points (if not included in #1) to ta l_______
3. Each Class A misdemeanor -1  point to ta l_______
C. Legal S tatus
1. Presently committed or detained 8 ______
2. Active case with last adjudication/disposition or adjudication 6 _____
continued within 90 days whether on conditional release or not
3. Active case with last adjudication/disposition or adjudication 2 _____
continued more than 90 days ago whether on conditional
release or not
D. Prior History
1. 3 adjudications/dispositions or 3 adjudications continued for felony 9 _____
level offenses in last twelve months, or
2. 2 adjudications/dispositions or 2 adjudications continued for felony 5 _____
level offenses in last twelve months, or
3. 1 adjudication/disposition for felony level offense or adjudication 2 _____
continued or 2 or more Class A misdemeanor adjudications, or
dispositions or adjudications continued in the  last tw elve months, or
4 . 3 or more adjudications/dispositions for Class A misdemeanor 3 _____
offenses or 3 or more adjudications continued for C lass A
misdemeanor offenses in last 12 months
E. Aggravating/Mitigating Factors
*. Aggravating factors (add to  score) specify: '  - 3 _____
(example: presently in sheiter care).
AOC-32*-0<S (06/00)
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2. Mitigating factors (subtract from score) specify: {*-3 minus)
(example: domestic assault involved mutual combat)
Fully docum ent the reasons for scoring aggravating or mitigating points
F. Detain/release decision Total (Sum A-S)___
0 - 6 points s  release
7 - 1 1  points *  eligible for shelter care, house arrest, electronic monitoring, day 
center, or other alternatives 
12* points *  eligible for secure detention
IV. SCREENING DECISION
Eligible for detention: □  Yes □  No
Placem ent: □  Secure □  Home O  Non-secure □  Release
Juage's name and court 
If JPPO recommended override - state reason(s):
If Judicial override - s ta te  reason(s) for override:
Releasee to : Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Address ___________________________________
Telephone _________________________________
Parent/Guardian refused to take youth home O  Yes O  No
Notification of Detention Hearing - Date: ___________________
Signature of person completing form Date
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V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE YDSU INTAKE OFFICER 
Y outh 's im m ediate m edication needs, if any:
VI. REVIEW OF INSTRUMENT BY THE YDSU INTAKE OFFICER
Is required inform ation provided? □  Y es □  No
Have points been  properly determ ined and com puted? □  Y es □  No
If youth  is n o t eligible for detention pursuant to  the  instrum ent,
has agency  responsible fcr sending been contacted? □  Y es □  No
Date: Signature of th e  YDSU intake officer
AOC-324-048 (06/00)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX E
REGRESSION EQUATIONS
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Backward Selection Terms Removed from Final Equations 










Offense Sev. -.01 .95
School Issues .09 29
Family Issues -.06 .49
County .12 .15
Age -.05 .58











Offense Sev. .05 .51
School Issues .00 .99
Family Issues -.03 .72
County .11 .17
Age -.05 .54
Family Status .04 .61
Race .08 .35








Offense Sev. 2.08 .15
School Issues .00 .98
Family Issues .05 .82
County .55 .46
Age 1.45 .23










Offense Sev. .90 .34
Family Issues .39 .53
County 1.01 .31









School Issues .67 .41
Family Issues .15 .70
County .25 .62
Age .02 .88
Family Status .06 .81
Race 2.01 .16
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